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Legal scholars have devoted significant scholarly attention to 
explaining why prosecutors reject postconviction evidence of innocence.1  
Indeed, some prosecutors have appealed postconviction defense motions 
exhaustively—even in the face of forensic evidence of innocence—rather 
than acknowledge a factual error.2  Yet, recent years have seen an undeniable 
shift.  Prosecutors have always had the authority, the ethical obligation, and 
the investigative tools to identify false convictions.3  Now it seems that some 
have the political will to remedy them as well.  As of 2018, the National 
 
 1 See generally Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel 
Vision, 49 HOW. L.J. 475 (2006) (discussing prosecutors’ reticence to reevaluate convictions 
even after evidence of guilt has been discredited); Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: 
An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 512 (2007) (arguing that prosecutors 
resist acknowledging exculpatory DNA evidence because of cognitive biases rather than 
ethical failures); Laurie L. Levenson, The Problem With Cynical Prosecutor’s Syndrome: 
Rethinking A Prosecutor’s Role in Post-Conviction Cases, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 335 
(2015) (arguing that senior prosecutors become cynical about innocence claims); Daniel S. 
Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 
84 B.U. L. REV. 125 (2004) (discussing how the institutional culture of prosecutors’ offices 
and political pressures encourage prosecutors to resist innocence claims); Aviva Orenstein, 
Facing the Unfaceable: Dealing with Prosecutorial Denial in Postconviction Cases of Actual 
Innocence, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 401 (2011) (arguing that a prosecutor’s self-perception as a 
champion of justice leads to denial of exculpatory DNA evidence in the postconviction stage); 
Hilary Ritter, It’s the Prosecution’s Story, but They’re Not Sticking to It: Applying Harmless 
Error and Judicial Estoppel to Exculpatory Post-Conviction DNA Testing Cases, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 825 (2005) (discussing how some prosecutors would rather invent a new 
theory of the crime rather than acknowledge errors discovered through postconviction DNA 
testing); Keith Swisher, Prosecutorial Conflicts of Interest in Post-Conviction Practice, 41 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 181 (2012) (describing the conflicts of interest that prosecutors experience 
in revisiting their own prior convictions). 
 2 See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-
Conviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467 (2009) (describing prosecutorial 
opposition in the Palladium nightclub case resulting in two wrongful convictions); Orenstein, 
supra note 1 (describing prosecutorial opposition in the cases of Wilton Dedge, Earl 
Washington and William McCaffrey); Ritter, supra note 1 (describing prosecutorial 
opposition in the case of Roy Criner); Swisher, supra note 1 (describing prosecutorial 
opposition in the case of Ray Krone). 
 3 Ethical obligations for prosecutors’ postconviction behavior, developed by the American 
Bar Association, stipulate that a prosecutor must “remedy the conviction” when the prosecutor 
becomes aware of “clear and convincing evidence” demonstrating that the defendant did not 
commit the offense. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018), htt
ps://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_
professionalconduct/rule38specialresponsibilitiesofaprosecutor/commentonrule38.html 
[https://perma.cc/S7NP-MBGV]. In addition, the National District Attorney Association 
(NDAA) has also issued postconviction standards, including the duty to “cooperate in post-
conviction discovery proceedings” and to notify the court and seek the release of the defendant 
if the prosecutor “is satisfied that a convicted person is actually innocent.” NATIONAL 
PROSECUTION STANDARDS, § 8, 1.7–1.8 (NAT’L DISTRICT ATT’Y ASS’N 2016). 
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Registry of Exonerations (NRE) reported that a total of 344 exonerations had 
been achieved with the assistance of Conviction Integrity Unit prosecutors.4  
Conviction Integrity Units (CIUs), also commonly known as Conviction 
Review Units (CRUs) among other titles, investigate claims of innocence and 
wrongful conviction claims through a separate unit in the chief attorney’s 
office.5  The rapid emergence of CIUs,6 and the hundreds of exonerations 
that have followed, demonstrate this shift. 
Scholars have welcomed the newly created CIUs;7 yet, aside from their 
existence, little is known about them.  Even less is known about prosecutors’ 
postconviction efforts outside the context of CIUs.  What are the 
circumstances that foster prosecutors’ assistance with exoneration?  What 
 
 4 National Registry of Exoneration: Exonerations in 2018, NEWKIRK CTR. FOR SCI. AND 
SOC’Y, app. tbl. A (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Document
s/Exonerations%20in%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BSK-CW96]. The National Registry of 
Exonerations is a project of the University of California Irvine Newkirk Center for Science & 
Society, University of Michigan Law School, and Michigan State University College of Law. 
 5 See, e.g., the following CIU website statements of purpose: Bexar County, TX (“The 
CIU will investigate claims of actual innocence or wrongful convictions by convicted 
defendants who have already been through their trial and appeal processes”) Conviction 
Integrity Unit, BEXAR COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, www.bexar.org/1422/Conviction-Integ
rity-Unit [https://perma.cc/M49S-YFCH] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020); Salt Lake City, UT  
(“The Conviction Review Unit (CRU) reviews and investigates post-conviction claims of 
innocence and makes recommendations to the District Attorney about the disposition of those 
claims.”) Salt Lake County District Attorney’s Office forms a Conviction Integrity Unit, SALT 
LAKE CITY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, https://slco.org/district-attorney/conviction-integrity/ [https: 
//perma.cc/9RAZ-N3JM] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020); Suffolk County, NY ( ”The Conviction 
Integrity Bureau (“CIB”) aims to achieve and ensure justice by investigating claims of 
innocence, remedying identified wrongful convictions, and providing proactive support and 
recommendations to the Office to prevent wrongful convictions”) Conviction Integrity 
Bureau, SUFFOLK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, https://suffolkcountyny.gov/da/About-the-Of
fice/Bureaus-and-Units/Conviction-Integrity-Bureau [https://perma.cc/YTA4-XXHN] (last 
visited Feb 11, 2020). 
 6 NEWKIRK CTR. FOR SCI. AND SOC’Y, supra note 4. At the close of 2018, forty-four CIUs 
had been created throughout the U.S. mostly in large, urban jurisdictions such as Dallas, 
Houston, Brooklyn, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Id. at 2. The advent of CIUs appeared in 2002 
and gained steadily in popularity since 2010. See id. at fig. 1. 
 7 See generally DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTORIAL COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO 
CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT 135 (2012) (“Taking a Fresh Look at Innocence: 
The Case for Prosecutorial Innocence Units”); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The Smart on Crime 
Prosecutor, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 905, 911 (2012) (recognizing CIUs); Hon. Alex 
Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xxxi (2015) (advocating 
for the creation of more conviction integrity units); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Enhancing the Justice 
Mission in the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 343 
(2010) (applauding the efforts of the Dallas County Conviction Integrity Unit). 
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processes have prosecutors’ offices developed to uncover false convictions?8  
How do they decide which innocence claims have merit?  The answer to these 
questions could enhance and encourage prosecutors’ postconviction 
cooperation both within and outside the context of the CIU.  It could 
contribute to a more holistic understanding of the additional resources still 
required to ensure the discovery of false convictions. 
Therefore, the present study illuminates both CIU processes and the 
efforts of prosecutors reviewing individual innocence claims.  I conducted 
semi-structured interviews with twenty prosecutors whose assistance had 
been instrumental to a post-2005 exoneration and also with nineteen defense 
attorneys who had worked with cooperative prosecutors on cases culminating 
in exoneration since 2005.  I asked these thirty-nine respondents about their 
experiences and decision-making structures in specific exoneration cases as 
well as their impressions of postconviction practices writ large. 
I found that postconviction decisions—such as which prosecutor should 
be tasked with reviewing innocence claims, how to screen and evaluate 
innocence claims, and how to decide the outcome of a case—reflect decision-
making at several levels.  Using organizational accident theory,9 we can 
conceptualize the following three levels: the top level of “the organization” 
establishes the organizing principles for postconviction innocence review; in 
this application it refers to the legal structure of the postconviction appeals 
process established by the courts and lawmakers.  These organizing 
principles are then communicated through “the workplace”—the district 
attorney and her executive team.  The executive team establishes policies 
reflective of the larger organization.  Finally, there is “the worker”—the 
individual prosecutor—who operates the machine.  The worker’s decisions 
are influenced and moderated by both the organization and the 
management.10 
 
 8 By using the term “false conviction” rather than “wrongful conviction,” I mean to narrow 
the focus of the discussion to actual innocence claims, as distinct from other types of 
conviction error; for example, a procedural error. Although some conviction integrity units do 
review these types of claims in addition to actual innocence claims, the present study 
investigates only those false conviction claims based, at least in part, on actual innocence. 
 9 Organizational accident theory provides a systems approach to identifying and 
correcting error. It attempts to look beyond individual actors to broader system failings that 
may have contributed to the errors. See e.g., JON SHANE, LEARNING FROM ERROR IN POLICING: 
A CASE STUDY IN ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENT THEORY (2013) (for an extended discussion of 
the theory and how it has been applied to criminal justice system failings). 
 10 See JAMES REASON, MANAGING THE RISKS OF ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS 16 (1997) 
(providing the concept for the hierarchical framework of the organization, the workplace, and 
the worker). 
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In the postconviction stage, executive-level decisions drive the 
decision-making process.  Unlike earlier-stage decisions—such as declining 
to prosecute or dismissing a case pre-trial—the decision to dismiss a false 
conviction remains at the discretion of the elected chief attorney.11  
Furthermore, the line prosecutor’s decision to recommend exoneration 
reflects executive decisions about how to process innocence claims.  At the 
same time, judicial and legislative decisions regarding the rules and 
procedures of the postconviction stage influence both line prosecutor and 
executive decisions.12  Teasing out these layers of decision-making is more 
than a theoretical exercise.  It carries implications for reforms of both policy 
(in the crafting of legislation and court rules) and in practice (in the 
processing of innocence claims through the prosecutor’s office). 
The Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I discusses the legal 
mechanisms for seeking relief from false conviction and places prosecutors’ 
role in reviewing postconviction innocence claims against the backdrop of 
the failings of the postconviction appeals process for the actually innocent.  
Part II describes the qualitative research methodology.  Part III reports the 
study findings according to a sequence of salient decisions marking an 
innocence claim’s route through the prosecutor’s office.  The sequence 
begins with deciding how to route innocence claims through the prosecutor’s 
office, next, how to screen them, and finally, how to make outcome decisions.  
In each part, I demonstrate how individual prosecutors’ postconviction 
decisions are informed and influenced by the office hierarchy and the 
postconviction appellate system. Part IV concludes with a discussion of the 
prosecutor’s role as a safeguard against false convictions as well as the policy 
implications of these findings. 
 
 11 E.g., Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutor Institutions and Incentives, 18 CRIMINOLOGY CRIM. 
JUST. L. & SOC’Y 85 (2017) (discussing the line prosecutor’s decision-making, including how 
supervisors in large jurisdictions may have limited information about the case-level decisions 
of their line staff). 
 12 Shawn Bushway & Brian Forst have developed a typology of discretion that captures 
this dynamic. See Shawn D. Bushway & Brian Forst, Studying Discretion in the Processes 
that Generate Criminal Justice Sanctions, 30 JUST. Q. 199, 201 (2013) (“The choice by 
legislators to impose sentencing guidelines is an act of Type B discretion—the legally 
allowable choice by judges of sentences within the sentencing guideline ranges is an act of 
‘weak’ or Type A discretion. Type B discretion, the ability to create rules and policies, can be 
used to limit and shape Type A discretion, and there is often a tension between the rules set 
by actors (Type B) and the discretion available to lower level actors within those rules (Type 
A).”). 
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I. LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR SEEKING RELIEF FROM FALSE 
CONVICTION 
Much like other “high-risk fields”13 (e.g. business, medicine, aviation), 
criminal justice system processes are complex and capable of producing 
serious accidents.  High-risk fields must, therefore, develop safeguards to 
prevent and protect against accident.  As James Doyle writes, criminal justice 
system safeguards, or “screens” may include a “police supervisory screen, a 
crime lab screen, a prosecutorial barrier, a grand jury process, an advisory 
trial screen, and an appellate review screen.”14  The appellate process 
operates as a late-stage safeguard against the possibility that accidents have 
occurred but have not yet been discovered.  CIUs have also been credited 
with providing safeguards to correct false convictions15 even after they have 
occurred.  Although the question of the prevalence of false convictions 
remains a subject of scholarly debate,16 it is generally agreed upon that not 
all false convictions have been (or will ever be) discovered.17  After all, 
criminal justice system accidents are less obvious than a plane crash, a market 
crash, or a dead patient.  As such, criminal justice system accidents may pass 
undetected more readily than they do in other high-risk fields.  Moreover, 
overturning false convictions presents the risk of false exoneration—a false 
negative.18  Further, in the pursuit of alternative suspects, attorneys risk 
 
 13 James M. Doyle, Orwell’s Elephant and the Etiology of Wrongful Convictions, 79 ALB. 
L. REV. 895, 903 (2015). 
 14 JAMES M. DOYLE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., LEARNING FROM ERROR IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM: SENTINEL EVENT REVIEWS, MENDING JUSTICE: SENTINEL EVENTS REVIEWS, A 
SPECIAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 3 (2014).  
 15 Id. 
 16 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Overstating America’s Wrongful Conviction Rate: 
Reassessing the Conventional Wisdom about the Prevalence of Wrongful Convictions, 60 
ARIZ. L. REV. 815 (2018) (arguing that wrongful conviction scholars have exaggerated the 
estimated rate of these types of errors); George C. Thomas, III, Where Have all the Innocents 
Gone?, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 865 (2018) (agreeing that previous estimates have been too high but 
also arguing that Cassell underestimates the wrongful conviction rate) (in response). 
 17 See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 through 2003, 95 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 533 (2005) (“a large number of false convictions in noncapital 
cases are never even discovered because nobody ever seriously investigates these cases”); see 
also Robert J. Ramsey & James Frank, Wrongful Conviction: Perceptions of Criminal Justice 
Professionals Regarding the Frequency of Wrongful Conviction and the Extent of System 
Errors, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 436, 441 (2007) (writing that exonerations underestimate the 
universe of wrongful convictions. “Most cases are the result of some serendipitous 
circumstance wherein a wrongly convicted individual fortuitously happens to have his or her 
case investigated by an individual or organization that champions their case and commits the 
resources necessary to see that justice is done.”). 
 18 See Brian Forst, Managing Miscarriages of Justice from Victimization to Reintegration, 
74 ALB. L. REV. 1209, 1212 n.8 (2010) (“Rigorous assessments of criminal justice policies 
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producing a second false positive should the reinvestigation falsely accuse 
an innocent person.19  Discovering and correcting organizational accidents in 
the criminal justice system therefore presents unique complexities.  It is 
within this high-risk field of complexity that prosecutors’ offices improvise 
systems for uncovering and correcting “accidents” of false convictions. 
Prosecutors’ role in detecting false convictions can best be understood 
against the backdrop of the failings of judicial review, for it is partly because 
of appellate system inadequacy that falsely convicted defendants have taken 
to prevailing upon prosecutors for relief.20  The legal scholarship suggests 
that judicial review is ill-equipped to identify the factually innocent for at 
least three reasons: 1) an overemphasis on procedural, rather than factual 
errors; 2) belated review of new exculpatory evidence; and 3) an assumption 
of judicial impartiality.  This relationship between judicial postconviction 
review and prosecutorial postconviction review demands a closer 
examination than it has received in previous legal scholarship.  Scholars have 
suggested that prosecutors provide safeguards against false conviction not 
otherwise available through judicial review.21  Therefore, I begin with an 
overview of appellate failings before turning to a discussion of prosecutors’ 
postconviction responses to innocence claims, both supportive and 
oppositional. 
A. DETECTING PROCEDURAL ERRORS, NOT FACTUAL ONES 
Findley and Scott aptly summarize the limitations of the appellate 
review process, writing, “One of the most startling revelations to newcomers 
to the justice system is that appeals have almost nothing to do with guilt or 
innocence.  Appellate courts, as a matter of principle, decide legal questions 
 
and decisions explicitly weigh the relative costs of these errors, often referred to as false 
positives (arrests and convictions of the innocent incarcerations of harmless people) and false 
negatives (failures to convict culpable offenders or to incarcerate dangerous convicts). In any 
given system, these two types of errors are often hydraulically linked, so that reducing one 
produces an increase in the other. In other cases, new technology and methods arise that allow 
for decreases in both errors simultaneously (DNA testing, more effective methods of 
interrogation).”). 
 19 See Paul G. Cassell, Tradeoffs Between Wrongful Convictions and Wrongful Acquittals: 
Understanding and Avoiding the Risks, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1435, 1447 (2018) (noting the 
case of Anthony Porter and Alstory Simon, in which Simon was convicted of the crime after 
Porter’s exoneration, and then Simon was also eventually exonerated). 
 20 See Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving Justice after Convictions, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 171, 175 (2005) (“[O]nce appeals are complete, the prosecutor may be the only 
participant in the criminal justice system in a position to rectify a wrong.”). 
 21 E.g., MEDWED, supra note 7, at 124 (“[A] prosecutor’s openness to an innocence claim 
is vital to ensuring a full-fledged airing in court because of long-standing judicial and 
legislative concerns about reexamining old cases.”). 
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and focus on process, not the accuracy of factual determinations.”22  
Historically, the purpose of the appeals process was not to remedy factual 
errors (as clemency was intended to accomplish)23 but rather to correct 
procedural ones.24 
Judicial review often results in default findings of “harmless error” or 
procedural justifications for denying the claim.25  Brandon Garrett’s study of 
200 DNA exoneration cases found that courts reviewing the cases on appeal 
often identified errors as harmless.26  The reversal rate for the DNA 
exonerations—in which defendants had later been forensically cleared—was 
indistinguishable from a matched comparison group of rape and murder 
convictions.27  Put simply, the defendants later revealed to be actually 
innocent were no more likely to receive relief than any other appellant. 
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to resolve the issue of 
whether freestanding actual innocence claims based on newly discovered 
evidence present sufficient legal justification for relief.28  In the paramount 
case of Herrera v. Collins, the Court had an opportunity to state whether 
actual innocence alone—in the absence of procedural errors—could ever 
constitute sufficient legal grounds for relief.  It neglected to do so.29  
 
 22 Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in 
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 348 (2006). 
 23 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 391 (1993) (“History shows that executive 
clemency is the traditional ‘fail safe’ remedy.”). 
 24 See Nancy J. King, Judicial Review: Appeals and Postconviction Proceedings, in 
EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: STEPPING BACK, MOVING FORWARD 217 (Allison D. 
Redlich et al. eds., 2014) (“A primary reason that judicial remedies have not provided a direct 
path to relief for the wrongfully convicted is that they were never intended to serve this 
purpose. Asking a judge to decide whether a conviction is factually accurate is like trying to 
fit a square peg in a round hole.”). 
 25 Brandon L. Garrett, Patterns of Errors, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 287, 291 (2017) (“Today, 
a wide range of procedural obstacles typically make it unnecessary for a judge to even reach 
the question whether a claim has any merit. Harmless error rules lie below many layers of 
procedural sediment.”). 
 26 Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 107–08 (2008). 
 27 See id. at 127 (finding a 14% reversal rate among the 200 cases, which excluding death 
penalty reversals, becomes 9%, statistically insignificant difference from that in the 
comparison group). 
 28 See Paige Kaneb, Innocence Presumed: A New Analysis of Innocence as a 
Constitutional Claim, 50 CAL. W.L. REV. 171, 186 (2014) (discussing Herrera v. Collins and 
writing, “[t]he court, without reaching the question of whether innocence is a valid 
constitutional claim, held that Herrera was not entitled to relief.” Kaneb also argues that 
Herrera’s case was “far from ideal for innocence” and that a stronger claim may have 
compelled the court to consider the question of whether innocence poses a freestanding claim 
for federal habeas review). 
 29 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 418–19 (1993). 
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Herrera’s petition, which was denied, introduced new evidence in the form 
of informant affidavits and did not raise procedural errors.30  The decision 
reinforces the legal primacy of procedural fairness over factual accuracy. 
Still, the Herrera ruling does not preclude state courts from recognizing 
newly discovered evidence of innocence as a valid basis for a postconviction 
claim, and many of them do.31  State caselaw and statutes often provide legal 
mechanisms for relief on newly discovered evidence of innocence alone, 
without also requiring a procedural grievance or a constitutional violation.32  
These remedies have their own shortcomings.  Brooks and colleagues’ 
survey of state laws finds many to be DNA-centric and to set a high legal 
standard for relief that puts the burden on the defendant to effectively 
establish his own innocence.33  Nancy King adds that many states have 
limited actual innocence legal remedies for certain types of defendants, 
“barring defendants whose persuasive proof of innocence is not DNA 
evidence, or defendants who pleaded guilty rather than going to trial.”34 
Therefore, falsely convicted defendants may rely upon trial errors—
improper jury instructions, prosecutors’ inflammatory statements, or 
ineffective assistance of counsel—to receive relief, but this strategy can 
 
 30 Id. at 416–17 (“[I]n state criminal proceedings the trial is the paramount event for 
determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Federal habeas review of state convictions 
has traditionally been limited to claims of constitutional violations occurring in the course of 
the underlying state criminal proceedings. Our federal habeas cases have treated claims of 
‘actual innocence,’ not as an independent constitutional claim, but as a basis upon which a 
habeas petitioner may have an independent constitutional claim considered on the merits, even 
though his habeas petition would otherwise be regarded as successive or abusive. History 
shows that the traditional remedy for claims of innocence based on new evidence, discovered 
too late in the day to file a new trial motion, has been executive clemency.”). 
 31 See Justin Brooks et al., If Hindsight Is 20/20, Our Justice System Should Not Be Blind 
to New Evidence of Innocence: A Survey of Post-Conviction New Evidence Statutes and a 
Proposed Model, 79 ALB. L. REV. 1045, 1078 (2015) (recognizing states such as California, 
Connecticut, Illinois, New Mexico and New York which “have explicitly recognized the right 
to a freestanding claim of actual innocence” and noting that still other states treat post-
conviction newly discovered evidence claims as synonymous to actual innocence claims); 
John M. Leventhal, A Survey of Federal and State Courts’ Approaches To A Constitutional 
Right Of Actual Innocence: Is There A Need For A State Constitutional Right In New York In 
The Aftermath Of CPL § 440.10(G-1), 76 ALB. L. REV. 1453, 1477 (2012) (discussing the 
states that recognize “freestanding claims of actual innocence” and the limitations of these 
measures, including Illinois, Missouri, New Mexico, and Maryland). 
 32 See generally Leventhal, supra note 31. 
 33 See Brooks et al., supra note 31, at 1054 (“Unfortunately, many of the changes to the 
criminal justice system and proposed legislation dealing with new evidence focus in large part 
on DNA test results.”). 
 34 Nancy J. King, Appeals, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 253, 270 (Erik Luna ed., 
2017). 
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preclude the possibility of ever establishing their factual innocence.35  
Indeed, some prosecutors have been faulted for ignoring the issue of actual 
innocence altogether by offering defendants some other form of relief in 
exchange for their freedom.  This often takes the form of an Alford plea, in 
which the defendant maintains his innocence but accepts that the prosecution 
has enough evidence to retry the case.36  Relief on procedural grounds cannot 
compare to exoneration as a remedy for the falsely convicted.  The defendant 
will not be eligible for compensation;37 and the system will have 
mischaracterized the true nature of the error.  Most importantly, the defendant 
will not be publicly vindicated and may not be recognized as factually 
innocent by his community and the general public. 
B. BELATED REVIEW OF NEW EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE 
In most states, after a brief window when defendants can file for a new 
trial, new evidence of innocence will not be considered until defendants have 
completed their direct appeal and entered the postconviction stage.38  This 
process can take years, meaning that only those serving lengthy prison 
sentences can avail themselves of the remedy.39  In addition, most states do 
not provide indigent defendants with an attorney in the postconviction 
stage.40  Without legal advocacy and expertise, and lacking the ability to 
 
 35 See King, supra note 24, at 224–25. 
 36 See Megan Rose, What Does an Innocent Man Have to Do to Go Free? Plead Guilty, 
PROPUBLICA, Sept. 7, 2017, https://www.propublica.org/article/what-does-an-innocent-man-
have-to-do-alford-plea-guilty [https://perma.cc/CG5K-EUMS] (detailing the ProPublica and 
The Atlantic investigation of cases in Baltimore City and County in which defendants with 
innocence claims accepted postconviction plea deals). 
 37 See Elizabeth Griffiths & Michael Owens, Remedying Wrongful Convictions: Societal 
Obligations to Exonerees, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: STEPPING BACK, MOVING FORWARD 
267, 270 (A.D. Redlich et al. eds., 2014) (noting that statutory compensation schemes often 
require forensic evidence of innocence or gubernatorial pardons). See generally Evan 
Mandery et al., Criminology: Compensation Statutes and Post-Exoneration Offending, 103 J 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 553 (2013) (providing overview of the importance of compensation 
in rehabilitating the wrongfully convicted). 
 38 See Daniel Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly 
Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 676 (2005) (“First, 
many time limits governing motions for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered 
evidence are remarkably brief. As a result, these remedies are of limited utility to the bulk of 
criminal defendants who, in the immediate aftermath of their convictions, might not have the 
resources or the good fortune to find new evidence.”). 
 39 See King, supra note 24, at 220 (reporting that the mean custodial sentence for state 
felony offenders is three years, “barely long enough to complete the appellate process”). 
 40 See Keith Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 
591, 605 (2009) (“While most states have statutes permitting motions for a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence, or permitting challenges to fact-based constitutional claims such 
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investigate from behind bars, filing pro se leaves indigent prisoners at a 
considerable disadvantage.41  Yet, in the postconviction stage, most 
claimants have no alternative.  Release may provide more opportunities for 
investigation and more financial opportunities to retain counsel, but these 
advantages are undermined by the defendant’s limited access to judicial 
review after incarceration.42  Despite evidence of the myriad injurious effects 
of a criminal record,43 courts tend to overlook the need for relief after a 
custodial sentence has been served.44 
C. ASSUMPTION OF IMPARTIALITY 
Claims in the postconviction stage—a defendant’s first meaningful 
opportunity to present new evidence—are typically sent first to the trial court 
and reviewed by the trial judge who originally handled the case.45  This 
 
as ineffective assistance or Brady claims, those proceedings are almost always collateral 
proceedings; they are not a part of the direct appeal process. As such, they usually come after 
the direct appeal, after the defendant has served significant time or even the full sentence in 
prison, and, most importantly, after the defendant no longer has a right to the assistance of 
counsel to present those claims.” Findley further notes that death penalty cases prove an 
exception to this general rule.). 
 41 See BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 
GO WRONG 195 (2011) (writing “[m]ost pro se petitioners simply don’t stand a chance”). 
 42 See King, supra note 24, at 220 (“In federal court and in just over half of the states, 
postconviction review is limited to prisoners who are still incarcerated or on parole after their 
direct appeals have been completed.”). 
 43 See generally ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS 
PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR (2016) (documenting how poor defendants suffer from nearly 
insurmountable financial obstacles through court-imposed monetary sanctions); DEVAH 
PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION 
(2007) (finding that criminal record holders, especially black men, experience employment 
discrimination); Alessandro Corda, More Justice and Less Harm: Reinventing Access to 
Criminal History Records, 60 HOW. L.J. 1 (2016) (arguing that public access to criminal 
records fosters an “enduring stigma” for record holders that leads to loss of opportunities); 
Sarah E. Lageson & Shadd Maruna, Digital Degradation: Stigma Management in the Internet 
Age, 20 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 113 (2017) (discussing the prevalence of online criminal 
records and their damaging effects to personal reputation); Elizabeth Westrope, Employment 
Discrimination on the Basis of Criminal History: Why an Anti-Discrimination Statute is a 
Necessary Remedy, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 367 (2018) (discussing the failure of 
current remedies such as expungement statutes to prevent the employment discrimination that 
criminal record holders face). 
 44 See King, supra note 24, at 220. 
 45 See Medwed, supra note 38, at 699 (writing that “many new trial motions and post-
conviction petitions premised on newly discovered non-DNA evidence are directed to the trial 
judge who handled the case originally”). Medwed also notes that habeas corpus petitions may 
be filed in the county of conviction or the county of confinement. Id.; see also King, supra 
note 24, at 220 (reporting that the postconviction petition for relief is filed in the trial court 
where petitioner was convicted). 
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system prioritizes efficiency over accuracy.  The trial judge will be familiar 
with the case.  She may use her existing knowledge of the case to evaluate 
the credibility of the claim.  This knowledge could be especially useful in 
cases involving recanting witnesses.  The disadvantage of such a practice is 
that the trial judge has a “vested interest” in denying that the conviction is 
flawed.46  The legal process assumes that judges maintain impartiality despite 
their involvement in the original trial. 
However, research into judicial decision-making and cognitive biases 
calls this assumption into question.  Findley and Scott’s analysis of cognitive 
bias in appellate review describes the influence of “outcome bias” and 
“hindsight bias.”47  They write: “the outcome of the case—conviction—tends 
to appear, in hindsight, to have been both inevitable and a ‘good’ decision.”48  
This may apply to judicial review in general49 and one would expect it may 
apply to the original trial judge in particular.  Judges, being human, may 
struggle to accept evidence that their earlier assessment was flawed.50  They 
may naturally ascribe a higher value to their own decision-making skills and 
“perceive themselves as fair individuals who, in the main, render or oversee 
correct decisions.”51 
By the time most defendants get the opportunity to introduce new 
evidence of innocence, the assertion of their guilt has been argued, 
established, and finalized on direct appeal.  Judges have professional 
incentives to avoid opening up new legal inroads to flimsy postconviction 
innocence claims.  Indeed, finality has legitimate benefits for crime victims 
and witnesses, for juries, and for courts.52  Victims need closure, and 
 
 46 Medwed, supra note 38, at 659–60 (“Even more, motions seeking relief on the grounds 
of new evidence are often filed with the original trial judge, a person who may have a vested 
interest in the outcome, and that judge’s decision normally receives tremendous deference on 
appeal.”). 
 47 Findley & Scott, supra note 22, at 319–20. 
 48 Id. at 320. 
 49 See id. at 320, 348 (writing “[h]indsight bias and outcome bias have particularly serious 
implications for appellate and postconviction review by judges” and “[n]ormative tunnel 
vision does not end after conviction; it intensifies as cases proceed through appellate and 
postconviction litigation.”). 
 50 See generally THOMAS GILOVICH, HOW WE KNOW WHAT ISN’T SO: THE FALLIBILITY OF 
HUMAN REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1991) (examining human tendencies to draw conclusions 
based on what we expect to see and what we want to see). 
 51 Medwed, supra note 38, at 701. 
 52 See Laurie L. Levenson, Searching for Injustice: The Challenge of Postconviction 
Discovery, Investigation, and Litigation, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 545, 552 (2014) (discussing the 
balance between accuracy and finality and exploring the legitimate interests in preserving 
finality); David Wolitz, Innocence Commissions and the Future of Post-Conviction Review, 
52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1027, 1054 (2010) (“Taking Finality Seriously”). 
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witnesses need assurance that they will not be badgered into recanting their 
testimony by convicted defendants and their family members.53  Juries may 
take their trial obligations more seriously when they believe that the verdict 
will stand.54  Courts, with limited resources and “newer and more pressing 
matters,” simply cannot prioritize postconviction review.55  After direct 
appeal, the system is invested in maintaining the conviction and expending 
few (if any) resources on continued litigation.56  Postconviction procedural 
rules reveal an “institutional bias in favor of preserving convictions at all 
costs” that applies on both the state and federal level.57 
This abiding interest in the principle of finality stands in direct tension 
with the need for factual accuracy.  To use a term from the organizational 
accident literature, case finality confers “productive advantages.”58  The need 
to deliver the final product is balanced against the importance of protection 
against accidents.59  Applied to the appellate context, the need to deliver 
finality must be weighed against the risk of failing to identify a false 
conviction.60  Historically, the appellate system has tipped the scales in favor 
of finality.61 
D. THE PROSECUTOR AS A PATHWAY TO EXONERATION 
Amidst this dearth of options for falsely convicted defendants, 
prosecutors have the power and the potential to provide an additional 
 
 53 See generally SERI IRAZOLA ET AL., STUDY OF VICTIM EXPERIENCES OF WRONGFUL 
CONVICTION (2013) (describing victims’ rights legislation with a duty to protect victims from 
the accused), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/244084.pdf [perma.cc/ZUW4-
7UU5]. 
 54 See Wolitz, supra note 52, at 1056 (“The idea here is that the system needs to invest 
some decision-maker(s)—namely, the trial judge and jury—with sufficient final authority to 
impress upon them the weight of their responsibility. Any increase in the ability of the litigants 
to reopen the case post-trial necessarily diminishes the trial court’s authority and thus 
undermines its sense of responsibility.”). 
 55 Id. at 1055 (“Any incremental increase in review adds to already overwhelmed dockets 
of courts, increases expenses, and takes away resources from adjudication of newer and more 
pressing matters.”). 
 56 See Leventhal, supra note 31, at 1466 (writing about federal courts’ reluctance to 
consider freestanding innocence claims). 
 57 Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Post-Conviction Procedure: The Next Frontier in 
Innocence Reform, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION 247, 252 (Daniel 
S. Medwed ed., 2017). 
 58 See REASON, supra note 10, at 6. 
 59 See id. 
 60 See id. at 4 (discussing the relationship between production and protection). 
 61 See Laurie L. Levenson, supra note 52, at 551 (“The criminal justice system is obsessed 
with finality.”). 
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safeguard.  Through their quasi-judicial role62 and their accountability “to 
seek justice within the bounds of the law, not merely to convict,”63 
prosecutors have both the opportunity and the incentive to facilitate 
exoneration in false conviction cases.  Moreover, a variety of developments 
may arise that would compel the prosecutor’s proactive review: They may 
become aware of new exculpatory evidence of innocence in a case (for 
example, when an alternate suspect confesses); they may identify defects in 
evidence submitted in pursuit of a previous conviction; or new technological 
developments may necessitate case review.64  Although prosecutors lack the 
authority to unilaterally release convicted defendants, they can bring a 
motion to vacate the judgement and order a new trial through the courts.  
Provided that the court grants the motion, prosecutors can then move to 
dismiss the case.65 
Legal and empirical research suggests that most prosecutors are 
typically unwilling to take this step.  In Gould and Leo’s study of 260 
wrongful conviction cases, prosecutors were found to have “played a 
significant role” in only 9% of the exonerations.66  The authors write that 
prosecutors “remain entrenched in a highly adversarial mindset in the post-
conviction exoneration process.”67  In Brandon Garrett’s study of 200 DNA 
exonerations, he finds that in at least seventy-one (36%) of the cases, 
defendants had to apply for a court order for DNA testing “absent willing 
cooperation of law enforcement.”68  A study of prosecutorial assistance 
among the exoneration cases listed by the NRE found that only 32% of 
prosecutors sought to help overturn the false conviction.69  In sum, the 
 
 62 See generally Stanley Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual 
Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197 (1988) (discussing the prosecutor’s dual quasi-judicial 
and adversarial roles). 
 63 AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION: 
STANDARD 3-1.2 “FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES OF THE PROSECUTOR,” https://www.americanbar.or
g/groups/criminal_justice/standards/ProsecutionFunctionFourthEdition/ 
[https://perma.cc/P7RV-AA6J]. 
 64 See Zacharias, supra note 20, at 176 (exploring the question “When are Prosecutors’ 
Postconviction Justice Obligations Implicated?”). 
 65 See generally id. at 185 (describing procedural process in detail). 
 66 Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, The Path to Exoneration, 79 ALB. L. REV. 325, 344 
(2015) (defining “significant role” as indicating that the prosecutors “engaged in substantial 
investigation or advocacy,” which surpasses simply not opposing defense motions. The 
authors also report that prosecutors opposed 10% of the exoneration cases.). 
 67 Id. at 332. 
 68 Garrett, supra note 26, at 119. 
 69 See Elizabeth Webster, A Postconviction Mentality: Prosecutorial Assistance in 
Exoneration Cases, 36 JUST. Q. 323, 333 (2019) (“Prosecutors provided some level of 
assistance with the exoneration in 32.5% or 524 of the 1,610 cases in the sample.”). 
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prosecutor’s modal response to postconviction innocence claims appears to 
be either resistance or ambivalence. 
Legal scholarship featuring case studies of prosecutors’ responses to 
innocence claims supports this empirical evidence.  Prosecutors’ denial of 
factual error, even in the face of dispositive evidence of innocence, has been 
a source of fascination for legal scholars.70  Research explores how some 
prosecutors have undermined efforts to uncover errors and refused to 
acknowledge those that do surface.  Prosecutors’ resistance to 
acknowledging factual errors has been attributed to both psychological 
bias71—similar to that experienced by reviewing judges—and to institutional 
pressures.72 
Postconviction claims often involve allegations of wrongdoing on the 
part of defense attorneys or prosecutors,73 since petitioners are limited in their 
ability to make these types of claims on direct appeal.74  New evidence of 
 
 70 See generally Bandes, supra note 1 (discussing the effect prosecutorial tunnel vision 
can have on wrongful convictions); Burke, supra note 1 (reviewing the problem of 
prosecutor’s cognitive bias in postconviction proceedings and inviting prosecutors to make 
modest reforms to combat these biases); Levenson, supra note 1 (focusing on the fact that 
senior prosecutors, and not young prosecutors, are more likely to resist exonerations); 
Medwed, supra note 1 (reviewing the political and organizational barriers that lead many 
prosecutors to ignore postconviction allegations of innocence); Orenstein, supra note 1 
(reviewing how and why prosecutors resist allowing DNA testing and deny the obvious 
implications of DNA evidence when that evidence exonerates the convicted); Ritter, supra 
note 1 (examining the court’s potential use of harmless error and judicial estoppel to prevent 
prosecutors from creating a new theory of the crime when the results of postconviction DNA 
testing undermine the theory upon which a defendant was convicted); Swisher, supra note 1 
(analyzing the ways prosecutorial review of postconviction cases causes conflicts of interest 
and suggestions of reform). 
 71 See Bandes, supra note 1; Burke, supra note 1; Alafair Burke, Improving Prosecutorial 
Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1632–
33 (2006). 
 72 See Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
309, 353 (2001) (discussing the conviction mentality that stems from “politics, institutional 
pressures, adversarialness, self-righteousness, and arrogance”); Medwed, supra note 1, at 
134–38 (exploring “[p]rofessional [i]ncentives to [o]btain and [m]aintain [c]onvictions”); 
Swisher, supra note 1, at 202–04 (describing prosecutors’ “[u]nhealthy [f]ear of [c]ivil 
[l]iability”). 
 73 See Levenson, supra note 52, at 572 (“It is not enough to argue that the petitioner may 
be innocent. Petitioners and their counsel must engage in the equivalent of thermal nuclear 
habeas warfare to succeed. The net result is a distorted, exaggerated practice where petitioners 
are more likely to argue that every prosecutor is a Brady cheater, every defense lawyer 
provides ineffective assistance of counsel, and every police officer is dismissive of 
exculpatory evidence.”) 
 74 See King, supra note 34, at 258 (explaining how direct appeal does not review claims 
like ineffective assistance of counsel or the state’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, 
both of which are common contributors to wrongful conviction). 
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innocence may include material, exculpatory evidence that was withheld 
from the defense in violation of Brady v. Maryland.75  Of those DNA 
exonerees in Garrett’s study bringing postconviction claims, the most 
successful raised ineffective assistance of counsel (29%) or allegations that 
prosecutors had withheld exculpatory evidence (16%).76  Brady violations 
could be the result of intentional misconduct or the inadvertent oversight of 
an overworked prosecutor.77  In either case, prosecutors would be 
understandably reticent to expose such an error, particularly if they would be 
the one held responsible for it.  In extreme cases, they may fear being sued 
or that their office may be sued.78  More likely, they may fear inviting 
professional reprisal and disciplinary sanction.79 
Institutional pressures may also discourage prosecutors from 
objectively considering postconviction innocence claims.  The “new 
prosecutor’s dilemma”80 lies in discovering innocent defendants amidst a sea 
of guilty petitioners.  Prosecutors, overwhelmed by the volume of 
postconviction motions, may become jaded to the possibility of innocence.81  
As a percentage of the prison population, relatively few defendants ever file 
postconviction motions, but this still translates to a large number of claims 
received.82  Daniel Medwed identifies a prosecutor’s “needle in a haystack 
disincentive,” writing, “Not only might a prosecutor be more dubious about 
the legitimacy of a specific motion given the quantity of comparable papers, 
but the sheer volume also makes it harder to isolate the meritorious claims, 
 
 75 373 U.S. 83, 91 (1963). 
 76 Garrett, supra note 26, at 96 (see “Table 5: Criminal Procedure Claims Raised by 
Exonerees”). 
 77 See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive 
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 263 (2011) 
(“[M]any prosecutors are asked to commit malpractice on a daily basis by handling far more 
cases than any lawyer can competently manage.”). 
 78 See Swisher, supra note 1, at 202–04 (describing prosecutors’ “[u]nhealthy [f]ear of 
[c]ivil [l]iability”); Zacharias, supra note 20, at 218 (discussing “[t]he range of conflicts of 
interest”). 
 79 See generally Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial 
Accountability, 157 PENN. L. REV. 960, 975–79 (2009) (discussing American Bar Association 
Rules of conduct and disciplinary sanctions—though acknowledging that these are rarely 
enforced—as well as internal office hiring and firing practices). 
 80 Dana Carver Boehm, The New Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Prosecutorial Ethics and the 
Evaluation of Actual Innocence, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 613, 620–23 (2014) (stating that the 
ethical obligations for prosecutors in the face of new postconviction exonerations have not 
been updated). 
 81 MEDWED, supra note 7, at 127 (“The last thing prosecutors want is to encourage 
prisoners to bury them with marginal innocence claims.”). 
 82 See Nancy J. King et al., Habeas Litigation in the U.S. District Courts, (Vand. U. Law 
Scho. Legal Stud. Research Paper No. 07-21, 2007). 
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even for the prosecutor predisposed to hunt for them.”83  Requests for 
postconviction DNA-testing have allowed some innocence claims to 
transcend the haystack.  Yet, in the twilight of the DNA era, innocence claims 
may increasingly hinge on non-DNA evidence,84 such as witness 
recantations, confessions of alternate suspects, and less probative forms of 
forensic evidence. 
Prosecutors’ disinclination to reconsider innocence claims—and in 
some cases, their outright and dogged opposition to these claims—can prove 
insurmountable for defendants.  Prosecutors enjoy broad postconviction 
discretion,85 and defendants are unlikely to prevail if the prosecutors oppose 
postconviction relief.86  On the other hand, when prosecutors facilitate an 
exoneration, they can provide an alternative safeguard for falsely convicted 
defendants when the appellate system fails.  For example, prosecutors’ 
support for postconviction forensic testing or evidentiary hearings in a case 
may help persuade judges to grant defendants’ requests.87  In addition, 
prosecutors’ access to law enforcement resources might facilitate 
reinvestigations. 
As CIUs have emerged, scholars have observed and welcomed them88 
as the “best chance”89 for systematically identifying false convictions and as 
a “smart on crime”90 criminal justice reform.  Several district attorneys and 
CIU chiefs have published articles describing their own processes,91 and 
 
 83 Medwed, supra note 1, at 149. 
 84 See Medwed, supra note 38, at 657–58 (describing the difficulty of achieving 
exoneration with non-DNA evidence). 
 85 See Zacharias, supra note 20, at 173 (“[P]rosecutorial discretion is at its height in the 
postconviction context”) 
 86 See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 486–87 (“A court is more likely to grant 
relief if a prosecutor joins in a defendant’s motion to set aside his conviction based on new 
evidence . . . Conversely, it would be exceedingly difficult to prevail over the prosecutors’ 
opposition either in court or in the executive mansion.”). 
 87 See Daniel Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35, 37 
(2009) (“A key variable, then, in the ability of a criminal defendant to have a chance for 
success on a post-conviction claim of innocence often lies in the nature of the prosecutor’s 
response; prosecutorial openness to the possibility of the defendant’s innocence may go a long 
way toward convincing the judge of the merits of that claim, if only to the extent of granting 
an evidentiary hearing.”). 
 88 See NEWKIRK CTR. FOR SCI. & SOC’Y, U. CAL. IRVINE, supra note 4, at 12 (noting the 
“important” role of CIUs in 2018 exonerations and writing “[a]s the number of CIUs increases, 
we may see more exonerations secured by cooperation of IOs [innocence organizations] and 
CIUs”). 
 89 Kozinski, supra note 7 (advocating for the creation of more conviction integrity units). 
 90 Fairfax, Jr., supra note 7, at 911. 
 91 E.g., Ingrid H. Chandler, Conviction Integrity Review Units: Owning the Past, 
Changing the Future, 31 CRIM. JUST. 14 (2016) (describing the Conviction Integrity Review 
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these tend to emphasize unit successes as well as prosecutors’ postconviction 
ethical obligations.  Scholarly research of CIUs includes articles exploring 
best practices,92 case studies analyzing a small subset of individual units,93 
and overviews providing details about the number and existence of CIUs.94  
Much of this research offers guidelines for CIUs in case reinvestigation, 
discovery-related concerns, working with police departments and defense 
attorneys, developing standards of review, training prosecutors, and more.95 
The most comprehensive of its kind, “Conviction Review Units: A 
National Review,”96 surveyed and interviewed nineteen CRUs and issued a 
series of recommendations, including independence from the appellate units, 
the ability to report directly to the district attorney, and the flexibility to allow 
 
Unit of Harris County, Texas); Cyrus R. Jr. Vance, The Conscience and Culture of a 
Prosecutor, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 629 (2013) (describing the formation and goals of the New 
York County District Attorney’s Conviction Integrity Program); Mike Ware, Dallas County 
Conviction Integrity Unit and the Importance of Getting It Right the First Time, 56 N.Y. L. 
SCH. L. REV. 1033 (2012) (describing the Dallas County Conviction Integrity Unit). 
 92 E.g., Barry C. Scheck, Conviction Integrity Units Revisited, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 705 
(2016) (reviewing recently created conviction integrity units across the country) [hereinafter 
Scheck, Conviction Integrity Units Revisited]; Barry C. Scheck, Professional and Conviction 
Integrity Programs: Why We need Them, Why They Will Work, and Models for Creating 
Them, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215 (2010) (creating a framework to consider for the 
development of Professional Integrity and Conviction Integrity units) [hereinafter Scheck, 
Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs]. 
 93 E.g., Boehm, supra note 80 (reporting on case studies of CIUs in five offices); see also 
ESTABLISHING CONVICTION INTEGRITY PROGRAMS, NYU LAW CENTER ON THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE REPORT, http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_
documents/Establishing_Conviction_Integrity_Programs_FinalReport_ecm_pro_073583.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2RQ3-FXNL] (focusing on Manhattan DA office and Santa Clara County’s 
CIU). 
 94 E.g., National Registry of Exonerations: Exonerations in 2017, NEWKIRK CTR. FOR SCI. 
& SOC’Y, U. CAL. IRVINE (2018), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents
/ExonerationsIn2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/YP6K-VXDE] (finding that there were thirty-three 
Conviction Integrity Units operating nationally in 2017); NEWKIRK CTR. FOR SCI. & SOC’Y, U. 
CAL. IRVINE, supra note 4, (finding forty-four CIUs in existence in 2018); Daniel Kroepsch, 
Prosecutorial Best Practices Committees and Conviction Integrity Units: How Internal 
Programs Are Fulfilling the Prosecutor’s Duty to Serve Justice, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
1095 (2016) (outlining the growth of Conviction Integrity Units from emergence in 2002 
through 2016). 
 95 E.g., Boehm, supra note 80; JOHN HOLLWAY, CONVICTION REVIEW UNITS: A NATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE, FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP AT PA. L. 1 (2016), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2615&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/27EC-3NA
W]; Kroepsch, supra note 94; Scheck, Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs, supra 
note 92; Scheck, Conviction Integrity Units Revisited, supra note 92. 
 96 Hollway, supra note 95. 
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for broad case selection criteria, among others.97  Above all, the report 
advocates for independence, flexibility, and transparency of prosecutorial 
practices.98  The report endeavors to provide guidelines for CRUs operating 
in good faith, observing that bad faith efforts—dubbed CRINOs (Conviction 
Review In Name Only), or “conviction preservation units”99—can be worse 
than no CRU at all for the threat that they pose to the legitimacy of sincere 
efforts in other jurisdictions. 
The Innocence Project has also developed guidelines for CIUs based on 
the experiences of innocence organizations collaborating with such units 
across the country.100  These include detailed recommendations for case 
intake and selection, investigation, staffing, reporting results, and learning 
from errors.101 Barry Scheck provides additional commentary on these 
guidelines, addressing several potential CIU pitfalls.102  For example, he 
writes: “Some prosecutors may be tempted to send all post-conviction 
matters that involve constitutional claims, such as Brady violations or 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, to their appeals unit even if the 
petitioner or their counsel raise ‘plausible’ claims of innocence and request a 
CIU investigation.”103  What is the source of this temptation for prosecutors?  
Perhaps prosecutors are tempted to assume that courts can handle 
postconviction cases that involve constitutional claims and therefore such 
cases don’t require CIU attention.  Perhaps they are reluctant to review 
allegations of intentional and unintentional misconduct that may arise in the 
context of a Brady violation or ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  
Whatever the case may be, Scheck’s commentary highlights the relevance of 
the office appeals unit and its relationship to the CIU. 
Beyond these few studies, scholarship has not kept pace with the rapid 
emergence of CIUs or examined their significance for prosecutorial 
discretion.  Research investigating the assistance of prosecutors reviewing 
innocence claims outside the context of a CIU has not yet appeared.  Even 
those who advocate for CIUs concede that it is impractical in most small 
 
 97 Id. The report’s recommendations, issued in four categories, include: Independence, 
Flexibility, Transparency and Prevention. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 19 n.25.  
 100 INNOCENCE PROJECT: CONVICTION INTEGRITY UNIT BEST PRACTICES 2, 4 (2015), 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Conviction-Integrity-Unit.pd
f [https://perma.cc/Q876-39EV]. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Scheck, Conviction Integrity Units Revisited, supra note 92, at 720–46. 
 103 Id. at 727. 
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jurisdictions to create such a unit.104  Approximately 74% of prosecutors’ 
offices serve a population of fewer than 100,000 people.105  A broader 
understanding of postconviction innocence review therefore depends upon 
examining processes in smaller and medium-sized jurisdictions as well. 
However, the difficulty of accessing prosecutors’ offices presents 
obstacles to conducting this type of research.  Green and Yaroshefsky 
describe a lack of transparency regarding postconviction processes:  
Certainly, there have been many reported cases in which prosecutors learned of new 
evidence, investigated or failed to investigate, and made or opposed efforts to secure 
the defendant’s release . . . But because prosecutors’ internal processes are not 
transparent, very little is known about the internal deliberations and rationales for what 
prosecutors have done.106 
Even with increased scrutiny on prosecutors’ postconviction decision-
making and with the creation of best practices in CIU jurisdictions, this lack 
of transparency remains an obstacle for researchers and for the general 
public.  The NRE has documented its attempts to reach CIUs in thirty-three 
of the jurisdictions where a CIU has been implemented.107  They found that 
ten of the units had no website and were also inaccessible by phone.108  The 
report concludes:  
As a result, it appears that these units are not, as a practical matter, accessible to the 
public at large.  In particular, innocent criminal defendants and concerned family 
members who seek exoneration are not likely to be able to present their cases to these 
CIUs unless they can afford to hire lawyers.109 
Discovering factual errors matters for the falsely convicted, and it 
matters for a system that wishes to learn from its errors.  However, the 
“marginalization of factual error,”110 the slow pace of justice, the denial of 
indigent postconviction defense counsel, and the assumption of judicial 
 
 104 See Hollway, supra note 95, at 21 (“It should be noted, though, that many smaller state 
or local prosecutors’ offices may lack the resources to separately staff a CRU.”). 
 105 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2007- STATISTICAL 
TABLES, NATIONAL CENSUS OF STATE COURT PROSECUTORS (2007), https://www.bjs.gov/cont
ent/pub/pdf/psc07st.pdf [https://perma.cc/K32S-N82Z]. 
 106 Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 481. 
 107 NEWKIRK CTR. FOR SCI. & SOC’Y, U. CAL. IRVINE, supra note 94, at 14–15. 
 108 See id. 
 109 NEWKIRK CTR. FOR SCI. & SOC’Y, U. CAL. IRVINE, supra note 94, at app. tbl. A; see 
also NEWKIRK CTR. FOR SCI. & SOC’Y, U. CAL. IRVINE, supra note 4, at app. tbl. A, (providing 
a similar table, which reports that thirteen of the now forty-four CIUs do not have web 
addresses). 
 110 DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 212 
(2012) (noting that court rulings reveal a prioritization of bureaucratic considerations “over 
the protections against false verdicts”). 
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impartiality undermine appellate review remedies.111  Furthermore, 
prosecutors do not appear to fill the “error correction gap”112 left by appellate 
shortcomings.113  While prosecutors have the potential to identify and rectify 
false convictions (and in some jurisdictions they have the demonstrated track 
record as well), research suggests that a variety of professional and 
psychological disincentives conspire to discourage prosecutors from doing 
so.114 
With this context, I now turn to the methodology. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
To explore this understudied area, I conducted semi-structured 
interviews with nineteen defense attorneys and twenty prosecutors.  In 
speaking directly with attorneys engaged in exoneration cases I hoped to 
develop an understanding of how prosecutors assist in the project of 
identifying and correcting false convictions, how they make decisions about 
individual cases, how they determine the practices that enable them to make 
those decisions, what challenges they face, and what more might yet be done.  
In this part, I explain the interview methodology and research design; I 
describe characteristics of the respondents, eligibility for participation, and 
interview questions; and I explore the strengths and limitations of the 
methods. 
Attorneys represented nineteen states and thirty-six unique jurisdictions 
and include sixteen women and four persons of color.115  All but two 
respondents had ten years or more of experience as criminal attorneys.  Three 
of the defense attorneys and six of the prosecutors formerly served as 
opposing counsel.  A trend among some urban jurisdictions has been to select 
a former defense attorney to head the CIU.116  In this sample, such CIU heads 
count as prosecutors.  Similarly, some defense attorney respondents had 
accrued more years of experience as prosecutors.  For ease of discussion, 
these two categories of “defense attorney” and “prosecuting attorney” are 
rendered static, though some respondents brought a variety of experiences on 
 
 111 See supra Section I.A–I.C. 
 112 King, supra note 34, at 270. 
 113 See supra Section I.D. 
 114 See supra Section I.D. 
 115 Defense attorneys are counted according to the county in which their client was 
exonerated. Most defense attorneys represented clients by state or region, handling cases 
outside their home jurisdiction. 
 116 See Scheck, Conviction Integrity Units Revisited, supra note 92, at 738–40 (discussing 
staffing recommendations for CIUs). 
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both sides of the courtroom to bear.  See Tables 1 and 2 for additional 
prosecutor and defense attorney characteristics. 
 
Table 1: Prosecutor Respondents (N=20) (Response Rate = 50%) 
 
Table 2: Defense Attorney Respondents (N=19) (Response Rate = 86%) 
 
Race 
   White 
 
18 
Career Stage as an Attorney 
   Early (< 10 years) 
 
0 
   Non-White 2    Mid (10 > 20 years) 10 
Gender 
   Male 
 
13 
   Late (> 20 years) 
   Retired 
7 
1 
   Female 7    No longer a prosecutor 2 
Type 
   Elected District Attorney 
 
5 
Geographic Region 
   Northeast 
 
5 
   Appellate Attorney 2    Midwest 5 
   Supervising Trial Attorney 4    South 6 
   CIU 9    West 4 
Experience as Opposing Counsel  Jurisdiction Size  
   Yes 6    Small (< 500k) 3 
   No 14    Medium (500k > 1 mil) 7 
     Large (> 1 mi) 10 
 
To be eligible for the study, defense attorney respondents must have 
served as one of the chief postconviction attorneys on an exoneration case 
that featured some level of assistance from prosecutors.  Prosecuting attorney 
Race 
  White  
 
17 
Career Stage as an Attorney 
  Early (< 10 years) 
 
2 
  Non-White 2   Mid (10 > 20 years) 8 
Gender 
  Male 
 
10 
  Late (> 20 years) 
Geographic Region 
9 
 
  Female 9  Northeast 6 
Type 
  Private 
 
5 
 Midwest 
 South 
4 
6 
  Public 6  West 3 
  Innocence Org 8 Experience as opposing counsel  
    Yes 3 
    No 16 
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respondents must have assisted defense counsel or else proactively facilitated 
or supported an exoneration.  Exoneration cases and attorneys were identified 
through the NRE, an online, open-source registry.  The NRE tracks U.S. 
cases since 1989, the year of the first DNA exoneration.117  Only those 
exoneration cases since 2005 were considered in order to avoid problems 
with retrospective reinterpretation and also to better capture recent 
exoneration processes.  Narrative case profiles are provided for each case 
listed by the NRE, and attorney respondents were culled from these profiles.  
When attorney names were not included in the case profile, background legal 
and media research was conducted to determine the actors involved.  Contact 
information for individual attorneys, or an attorney’s assistant, was then 
accessed online. 
Determinations about whether or not prosecutors had assisted with the 
exoneration were based on any one of a number of supportive actions, for 
example: joining in a defense motion to vacate the conviction, reinvestigating 
a troubled conviction, requesting postconviction forensic testing, and 
more.118  I reviewed these case profiles as well as non-public NRE data about 
the prosecutor’s role in 1,610 state-based exonerations to determine the 
prosecutor’s actions in each case.  Whenever necessary, I supplemented this 
information by researching news articles and legal documents online.  Details 
 
 117 THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS: GLOSSARY, https://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Pages/glossary.aspx [https://perma.cc/86QZ-6V5Z] (last visited Nov. 2, 
2019) (explaining that exonerations come about in a variety of ways: through a pardon or 
certificate of innocence, an acquittal on retrial, a posthumous exoneration, or, most commonly, 
the prosecution or judge’s decision to dismiss charges postconviction). When highly probative 
material evidence like DNA exists, the defendant may receive a pardon based on innocence. 
Conversely, the exoneration may take the form of an acquittal at retrial. In these cases, 
prosecutors pursued a new conviction, but the new evidence of innocence sufficiently 
convinced the jury of reasonable doubt. Id. The NRE definition of “exoneration” depends 
upon evidence of innocence, but not upon an explicit declaration of innocence. The NRE does 
not claim to know whether every exonerated person listed is factually innocent. Id.; see also 
SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1989–2012: 
REPORT BY THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS 6 (2012), https://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DP6B-DWTX] (In defining exoneration, Gross and Shaffer explain that they 
“do not claim to be able to determine the guilt or innocence of convicted defendants,” because 
“in difficult cases, nobody can do that reliably.”). 
 118 Other supportive actions include recommending that the case be dismissed or that the 
defendant be pardoned, publicly asserting belief in the defendant’s innocence or apologizing, 
assisting or supporting the conviction review efforts of other government officers, and 
pursuing postconviction evidence of innocence and sharing this evidence with defense soon 
after discovery. In some cases, prosecutors’ supportive actions were undermined by resistance 
or opposition. When the available evidence suggested that prosecutors obstructed the path to 
exoneration, then the prosecutor was not considered to have assisted in that case. More 
detailed information is available from the author upon request. 
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of the litigation were not always discoverable; determinations were made 
based on the available information.  In total, 524 cases were determined to 
have involved some degree of prosecutorial assistance.  Narrowing the 
sample to those exonerations since 2005 resulted in 330 exoneration cases 
through which attorney respondents would be considered eligible for this 
study. 
Case selection was further narrowed to avoid over-sampling of 
attorneys from any one state.  Over half of the eligible cases (177 of 330) 
came from just three states: Texas, New York, and Illinois.  I sought variety 
so as to avoid overemphasizing legal practices and statutory idiosyncrasies 
peculiar to specific states.  I also avoided over-sampling attorneys who had 
worked on DNA exoneration cases since decision-making processes in these 
cases may follow a similar pattern (culminating in forensic evidence of 
innocence). 
I intentionally did not select attorneys who worked together on the same 
exoneration case.  Though this design would have strengthened internal 
validity by triangulating information through at least two participants, it 
would also have undermined efforts to guarantee confidentiality since 
respondents could easily discover that their counterpart on the case had also 
been interviewed.  Furthermore, sourcing a wider variety of jurisdictions 
enhances external validity while also permitting prosecutors who have 
assisted with an exoneration independently—or with minimal involvement 
from the defense—to be included in the sample.  Finally, selecting only pairs 
of attorneys may have introduced a selection bias towards compatible, 
cooperative relationships since attorneys may be less willing to speak 
critically of their counterpart if that individual was also being interviewed. 
Interviews were conducted between April 2016 and November 2018.  
Whenever possible, I made arrangements to conduct these interviews in 
person; however, given the national scope of the study, most interviews were 
conducted over the phone.119  All but one of these interviews (which was 
documented by typewritten notes at the respondent’s request) were audio 
recorded and transcribed soon after the recording.  Defense attorney and 
prosecutor interviews were conducted concurrently.  Statements made by 
each group informed an evolving understanding of the other. 
The average interview length was eighty-four minutes.  Each of the two 
semi-structured interview guides (one for prosecutors and one for defense 
 
 119 In total, twelve of the defense attorneys and four of the prosecuting attorneys were 
interviewed in person. The rest were conducted over the phone. 
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attorneys) 120 began by referencing a specific case experience.  These 
questions generated responses about the step-by-step process leading to the 
exoneration.  For example, questions probed how prosecutors initially 
became aware of the innocence claim, the nature of the communication 
between prosecutors and defense attorneys, and the elected prosecutor’s role 
in the exoneration case.  The interview then elicited details about 
participants’ postconviction experiences beyond that individual case, 
specifically, the criteria that the office used to decide how to respond to 
postconviction evidence of innocence, and the processes involved in 
decision-making as cases progressed from intake to review to resolution.  
Additionally, prosecutors were asked to recall a case that had not culminated 
in exoneration, and defense attorneys were asked to share experiences 
working on cases in which prosecutors had not agreed to relief. 
Though all attorneys could speak broadly about their practices and 
experiences in the postconviction stage, not all of them chose to provide 
details about a specific exoneration case.  Some attorneys spoke in more 
general terms out of confidentiality concerns, out of caution about potential 
civil litigation involving the exonerated defendant, or because they preferred 
to reference a larger set of exoneration cases (for example, all those handled 
by the CIU).  See Table 3 for case characteristics of the twenty-eight cases  
for which detailed information was provided. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 120 Interview guides are available from the author upon request. The defense attorney 
guide contains thirty-nine questions and the prosecutor guide contains forty-three. These 
guides are intended to be exhaustive so that they might anticipate all of the various types of 
cases and processes under discussion. For example, prosecutor guides include a separate set 
of questions for CIU prosecutors (“About how many cases has the CIU reviewed?”) and also 
for non-CIU prosecutors (“Does your office have a procedure for investigating claims of actual 
innocence?”). Not every question applies to every respondent. Moreover, time constraints of 
some respondents precluded the opportunity to answer every question. Rather, a grounded 
theory style of interviewing is “open-ended yet directed, shaped yet emergent, and paced yet 
unrestricted.” See KATHY CHARMAZ, CONSTRUCTING GROUNDED THEORY 85 (2d ed. 2014). 
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Table 3. Exoneration Cases (N = 29) 
* Will Not Total to 29 
A. STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS 
Existing research reflects an interest in official prosecutor-led efforts, 
such as CIUs, thus overlooking smaller, more episodic efforts.121  The current 
study samples purposively according to attorney affiliation, seeking 
respondents working out of official exoneration shops—such as innocence 
organizations and CIUs—but also those responding to individual innocence 
claims.  Gathering a range of perspectives and experiences from attorneys in 
different-sized jurisdictions results in a broader range of practices to assess 
and to generate postconviction innocence review models for other 
jurisdictions.  The current study seeks to establish a broad understanding of 
 
 121 See generally Boehm, supra note 80; Hollway, supra note 95, at 1; Kroepsch, supra 
note 94; Scheck, Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs, supra note 92; Scheck, 
Conviction Integrity Units Revisited, supra note 92; NEWKIRK CTR. FOR SCI. & SOC’Y, U. CAL. 
IRVINE, supra note 94; NEWKIRK CTR. FOR SCI. & SOC’Y, U. CAL. IRVINE, supra note 4. 
Defendant Race 
  White  
 
11 
Exonerating Evidence* 
  DNA 
 
12 
  Black 16   Non-DNA Forensic 9 
  Hispanic/ Other 2   New witness 3 
Defendant Gender 
  Male 
 
29 
  Recantation 
  Alt suspect identified 
8 
5 
  Female 0   Other 6 
Defendant Prior Criminal History   Postconviction Review 
Type 
 
  No 1   CIU 2 
  Yes 
  Unknown 
26 
2 
  CIU + Innocence Org 
  Innocence Org 
5 
10 
Case Disposition 
  Plea 
 
5 
  Other 
Geographic Region 
12 
  Trial 24   Northeast 6 
Offense    Midwest 8 
  Murder 14   South 11 
  Sexual Assault 9   West 4 
  Other 6 Jurisdiction Size  
Year Exonerated 
  2005 – 2009  
 
6 
  Small (< 500k) 
  Medium (500k > 1 mil) 
8 
9 
  2010 – present 23   Large (> 1 mi) 12 
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the advantages and pitfalls of different processes so that practitioners might 
learn from their counterparts in similarly situated jurisdictions.  During this 
time of CIU adoption and innovation, the desire to develop best practices 
must be moderated by the risk of pushing prosecutors’ offices into the same 
mold.  The present study seeks to recognize diversity, thus resisting “a 
generic portrait of prosecution.”122 
The study design offers three points of comparison: between 
prosecuting attorney respondents and defense attorney respondents, among 
prosecuting attorneys, and among defense attorneys.  These multiple points 
of comparison allow for an examination of the similarities and differences in 
the unique types of postconviction actions, processes, and practices 
employed in the postconviction arena by public, private, and innocence 
organization attorneys and also by CIU chiefs, elected prosecutors, and line 
prosecutors.  This study analyzes how defense attorneys describe successful 
postconviction collaborations compared to how prosecutors envision them.  
Prosecutor respondents may naturally wish to emphasize strengths and 
minimize shortcomings when describing their work and decision-making.  
Defense attorneys’ responses can provide additional context.  For example, 
defense attorneys’ explanations of the hierarchical constraints that 
prosecutors face provided valuable insights that would not have emerged 
from the prosecutor interviews alone.  Perhaps prosecutor respondents 
hesitated to question the internal policies established by their superiors.  
Therefore, defense attorney perspectives helped contribute a multi-
dimensional view of postconviction innocence review processes.  Though 
prosecutor and defense attorney respondents did not work together on the 
same exoneration case, they were able to reference the same types of 
processes.  Defense attorneys described their perceptions from the outside 
looking in, while the prosecutors provided a subjective internal view.  These 
different perspectives contributed a more balanced accounting. 
The research endeavor was aided by the use of “grounded theory” 
methods.123  The researcher applying grounded theory develops tentative 
“sensitizing concepts”124 in advance that may be based on existing theories 
and scholarship, but also allows new concepts to emerge through data 
 
 122 Ronald Wright et al., The Many Faces of Prosecution, 1 STAN. J. CRIM. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 27, 27 (2014). 
 123 See generally CHARMAZ, supra note 120, at 85 (providing more information about 
grounded theory methods). 
 124 HERBERT BLUMER, SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM: PERSPECTIVE AND METHOD 147 
(1969). 
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collection.125  Grounded theory requires an inductive, iterative process of 
simultaneous data collection and analysis “to make early stops to analyze 
what you find along your path.”126  The grounded theory style of intensive 
interviewing works to provide a positive experience for the interviewee and 
to close the interview on a positive note.127  Speaking about positive 
examples of the postconviction process helped put respondents at ease and 
encouraged open-ended responses. 
The study takes a broad-brush approach to exploring a nascent area of 
research.  These findings represent a first step in understanding prosecutors’ 
postconviction processes and decisions but only among those prosecutors 
who have already demonstrated a willingness to help overturn false 
convictions.  It does not illuminate the decision-making, motivations, or 
postconviction practices of prosecutors who have never assisted with an 
exoneration case.  Nevertheless, by initiating the inquiry with this subset of 
responsive prosecutors, we are then free to evaluate the efficacy of practices 
that might be assumed to represent the very best of prosecutors’ 
postconviction efforts to remedy false convictions. 
However, when an exoneration escapes attention—as many surely do—
the prosecution’s efforts cannot be taken into account.  NRE Exoneration 
cases selected may vary from the larger universe of all exoneration cases in 
non-random ways.  The NRE compiles cases when either 1) new 
exonerations appear in the news and are publicized by legal advocacy groups, 
or 2) low-profile exoneration cases that have not been publicized are 
discovered by NRE researchers through internet media research, legal 
research, or outreach to public officials.  Jurisdictions do not maintain 
systematic records of exonerations.  For this reason, the dataset may over-
represent those cases from jurisdictions that better publicize exonerations, as 
well as those capturing the attention of the media and of innocence 
organizations.128  Exonerations represent a small sample of false conviction 
 
 125 See generally BARNEY G. GLASER & ANSELM L. STRAUSS, THE DISCOVERY OF 
GROUNDED THEORY: STRATEGIES FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1967) (developing grounded 
theory methods of qualitative data collection and analysis). 
 126 CHARMAZ, supra note 120, at 1 (describing how grounded theory methods incorporate 
initial coding and focused coding of the qualitative data). 
 127 See id. at 70. 
 128 See Samuel R. Gross, What We Think, What We Know and What We Think We Know 
About False Convictions, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 753, 761 (2017) (“With no practical way to 
identify exonerations from official records, most of the ones we know about are those that get 
substantial attention in the media and on the internet. That’s unlikely to happen if the 
participants are not interested in attention or actively seek to avoid it. For many exonerations, 
avoiding attention may be a goal of all of the professional participants in the case: police, 
prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys.”). 
2020] HOW PROSECUTORS ASSIST WITH EXONERATION 273 
cases, and the NRE does not discover every exoneration.  Nevertheless, it 
represents the most comprehensive and reliable source of exoneration data 
presently available. 
The low response rate among prosecutors requires further explanation 
as well.  While a handful of respondents were known to me through 
professional contacts, most were recruited “cold,” resulting in a response rate 
of 86% for defense attorneys (nineteen of twenty-two contacted) and 50% 
(twenty of forty contacted) for prosecutors.129  The low response rate for 
prosecutors may illustrate a selection bias.  These results cannot be 
generalized to all prosecutors, or even all prosecutors assisting with 
exoneration claims.  Instead, findings represent that subset of prosecutors 
who not only have assisted, but were also willing to talk about their 
postconviction processes at length.  They might, therefore, be more receptive 
to innocence claims than the average prosecutor.  They may also be more 
experienced or at least enjoy enough “vertical autonomy”130 to agree to an 
interview without requiring their supervisors’ permission.  Of the twenty 
prosecuting attorney respondents interviewed, eleven were assistant district 
attorneys who made recommendations about a case for their superiors to 
decide, four were veterans reporting directly to the elected district attorneys, 
and five described experiences as the elected district attorneys. 
The need to obtain the approval of supervisors may have prevented 
some prosecutors from participating in the study.  Some who suggested 
interest explained that they would need to clear it with their boss first or “run 
it up the chain.”  Communication often ceased after that.  None of the defense 
attorney respondents—whether innocence organization attorneys, public 
defenders, or private attorneys—mentioned needing to check with their boss 
first.131  Therefore, line prosecutors at the lowest levels of the office hierarchy 
are underrepresented in this study.  Insights about line prosecutors’ 
 
 129 Low response rate for prosecutors is not inconsistent with previous studies. See 
Ramsey & Frank, supra note 17, at 448 (reporting a 47% response rate for prosecutors 
responding to a survey that asked for estimates of the false conviction error rate); Marvin 
Zalman et al., Officials’ Estimates of the Incidence of ‘Actual Innocence’ Convictions, 25 
JUST. Q. 72, 82 (2008) (reporting 28% response rate among Michigan prosecutors and a 47% 
response rate among Ohio prosecutors). 
 130 Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecution in 3-D, 102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1119, 1147 (2013) (“By vertical autonomy, we mean the degree of 
independence each prosecutor feels from his boss (or supervisor) when it comes to making 
decisions on his own cases.”). 
 131 A few of these defense attorney respondents were known to me through professional 
relationships forged in my former position at the Innocence Project. Nevertheless, like 
prosecutor respondents, the majority were recruited without any previous contact or referral. 
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postconviction role in innocence review was supplemented by the many 
defense attorney respondents who had worked with these prosecutors. 
III. FINDINGS 
In reporting the findings, I follow the route that an innocence claim 
takes through the prosecutor’s office, highlighting a series of salient 
decisions: 1) which individual, or which unit, will be tasked with reviewing 
postconviction innocence claims; 2) how cases will be screened and 
evaluated upon arrival; and 3) how outcome decisions will be made (e.g. 
whether the case will be dismissed, the innocence claim denied, or some 
other form of relief will be granted).  I take each in sequential order and 
describe how several levels of discretion shape these decisions. 
A. SELECTING THE PROSECUTOR TASKED WITH INNOCENCE 
REVIEW 
Whether a district attorney is responding to a single wrongful conviction 
claim or proactively interested in reviewing a set of claims, her first step will 
be to decide who should be tasked with the review.  Will the district attorney 
seek to create a CIU, or direct innocence claims to an existing appellate 
division, the original trial prosecutor, or someone else?  Such decisions 
necessarily involve the district attorney’s vision for how the review process 
should be conducted.  With the exception of those jurisdictions that have 
publicly announced creation of a CIU, little is known about how prosecutors’ 
offices receive innocence claims.132 
Among the prosecutor respondents, some believed that innocence 
claims should be reviewed in the appellate division, while others argued that 
they should be distinguished as a separate type of claim entirely.133  The 
prosecutors represented here have all already demonstrated a willingness to 
remedy false convictions; therefore, we might reasonably expect 
postconviction processes in these offices to be more successful at identifying 
errors than those in the typical prosecutor’s office.  Most prosecutor 
respondents reported that innocence claims in their office were routed either 
 
 132 See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 494 (“Little information is publicly 
available about how prosecutors’ offices respond, because little, if any, of their internal 
processes is exposed to public view.”). 
 133 To protect respondents’ confidentiality, all interviewees have been assigned a number 
and will be designated by this number in direct quotes. When prosecutors are referenced, but 
not quoted, the citation omits interviewee numbers in the interests of confidentiality. 
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to CIUs (N=10)134 or to appeals divisions (N=4).135  CIU attorneys, and the 
defense attorneys who worked with them, regularly contrasted the CIU 
approach with the appeals approach.  While these two structures dominated, 
prosecutors working outside of either CIU or appeals revealed a variety of 
alternative approaches.  Among the six remaining prosecutors’ offices (those 
who did not follow either CIUs or appellate divisions to review innocence 
claims), two routed innocence claims to the original trial prosecutor, two to 
a veteran member of the executive team, and in two offices they went directly 
to the district attorney.136 
1. Conviction Integrity Units 
The nine prosecutors working in CIUs offered a variety of explanations 
for why the district attorney had established their CIUs: a desire for “good 
community juju”137 (or fostering community goodwill), to keep pace with a 
neighboring jurisdiction, in response to a high-profile exoneration, in 
response to new legislation,138 or in response to an increase in actual 
innocence claims from the defense bar.  The development of the CIU, 
therefore, adapted to a shifting legal landscape, marked by new expectations 
of prosecutors from the public, legislators, and defense attorneys.  CIUs are 
a recent phenomenon, only emerging in the last fifteen years;139 due to their 
novelty, chief prosecutors, or the CIU attorneys they appointed, described 
processes of establishing the CIU shape and structure.  Nearly every CIU 
 
 134 Some CIUs did not handle innocence claims exclusively but also routinely reviewed 
traditional appellate claims. For the purposes of categorization, if the office had established a 
CIU, it is counted as such, even if CIU attorneys also handled appeals or if their innocence 
review work was only part-time. 
 135 Because some interviews were conducted with upper management who spoke about 
innocence claims as handled by a staff attorney, these numbers will not always correspond 
with the type of attorney interviewed. Rather, district attorneys and members of the executive 
team reported on standard office practices. 
 136 Defense attorney respondents shared a wide variety of experiences working with CIUs, 
appeals, original trial prosecutors, supervising trial prosecutors, and elected district attorneys. 
 137 Interview with Prosecutor 6 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with author). 
 138 For example, a district attorney may wish to create a conviction integrity unit in 
response to the passage of a postconviction new evidence statute in their state, which could 
facilitate defendants’ ability to file postconviction legal challenges, thus increasing the volume 
of innocence claims. 
 139 NEWKIRK CTR. FOR SCI. & SOC’Y, U. CAL. IRVINE, supra note 4, at fig. 1, (reporting 
“Number of Conviction Integrity Units in Operation by Year”). This figure charts the first CIU 
in 2003, with a steady incline beginning in 2009. 
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attorney described an adjustment period in establishing protocols.140  One 
referred to her CIU as a “work in progress.”141 
About half of the defense attorney respondents could share experiences 
working directly with a CIU (or even multiple CIUs) or in collaboration with 
prosecutors just prior to the establishment of the CIU.  Three defense 
attorneys who had ongoing relationships with a CIU observed the same 
work-in-progress element of its evolution, or as one innocence organization 
attorney put it, “they have significant growing pains.”142  Two others believed 
that the creation of the CIU had not changed much about how the office 
conducted postconviction business, either because the office conducted 
legitimate innocence review already (“I can’t believe there’s that much 
difference, they’re just calling it ‘integrity’”143), or because they believed that 
the unit was a CRINO.  A few defense attorney respondents called out the 
hypocrisy of offices that they believed had created a CRINO for political 
purposes (“It’s not real. It doesn’t exist, they just say they have it.”)144 
Nevertheless, most defense attorneys acknowledged a qualitative difference 
in the CIU approach, or at least, a genuine attempt to approach innocence 
claims differently.  For example, one public defense attorney offered 
qualified praise: “Here, within a relatively short period of time . . . . there 
were actual innocent people getting out. As much as we say we’d like more 
to have been done, no other district attorney’s office in the state would have 
done what they did.”145 
As reflected in this defense attorney’s statement, some respondents 
cited exonerations as proof of a CIU’s success.  At the same time, as we will 
see, the distinction between CIU review and more traditional postconviction 
review was often spoken about more in terms of mindset than of process or 
outcome.  In particular, CIU prosecutors and defense attorney respondents 
distinguished the CIU approach from the appeals approach. 
 
 140 I describe any respondent prosecutor working in a CIU as a “CIU attorney” or “CIU 
prosecutor.” However, in practice, some of these prosecutors balanced a mixed caseload 
including more traditional appeals as well. 
 141 Interview with Prosecutor 33 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 142 Interview with Defense Attorney 36 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 143 Interview with Defense Attorney 2 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 144 Interview with Defense Attorney 7 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 145 Interview with Defense Attorney 12 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
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2. Appellate Divisions 
Half of the prosecutor respondents did not have a CIU in their office, 
though their offices may have been large enough to accommodate such a unit.  
Two of the prosecutors expressed doubts that their office needed any large-
scale conviction review because of its strong history146 or reputation.147  Two 
others believed resources were better allocated towards the front end, 
preventing false convictions.148  The four prosecutors working in offices 
where appellate divisions handled their innocence claims believed that 
appeals served that function already and that establishing a CIU would 
merely duplicate existing efforts.149 
Attorneys in different jurisdictions referred to the division as “appeals,” 
“postconviction review,” “PCR,” “habeas,” or “writs.”  CIU prosecutors and 
defense attorneys regularly characterized the work of appellate prosecutors 
to be at cross purposes with innocence review.  The exact terms of the inter-
office relationship between CIU prosecutors and appellate prosecutors 
emerged as a theme in interviews with these respondents.  For example, when 
I asked a CIU attorney to imagine the appeals division in her office playing 
a larger role in innocence review, she said, “It’s a great idea. Is it a realistic 
idea? Maybe at some point in the future, but I don’t think we’re going to get 
there for a long time. Appellate prosecutors are trained so differently . . . It’s 
almost like this huge cognitive bias.” She added: 
People talk in terms of appellate lawyers go in with a presumption that the conviction 
is valid. They don’t go in with a presumption, they go in with absolute confidence . . . 
. . . They see a conviction, and there’s not going to be, “Oh, this person may not be 
guilty.” They’re going to say: “This person is guilty.”150 
 
 146 Interview with Prosecutor 17 (“I think that’s a decision that the elected DAs have to 
make when they look at their office and what their history is, and whether it is needed. I don’t 
know if it is needed everywhere, but  . . . if the public for some reason is having some issues 
with decisions by the elected DA and her assistants, then maybe it’s a good idea to have 
someone give a little oversight. I don’t think it is necessarily required.”) (confidential 
unpublished interview) (on file with author). 
 147 Interview with Prosecutor 34 (“That’s part of our job. I don’t need a conviction 
integrity unit to do that. I think our record speaks for itself.”) (confidential unpublished 
interview) (on file with author). 
 148 E.g., Interview with Prosecutor 19 (“I think we’ve come in on the front end, we have 
things in place to prevent that from happening[.]”) (confidential unpublished interview) (on 
file with author); Interview with Prosecutor 20 (“I think the more fertile ground is not 
conviction review units but prosecution integrity units. That is to make sure that we are going 
forward against the right person.”) (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with author). 
 149 Appeals can also be handled externally by the Attorney General’s office. Among 
respondents, three stated that at least some appellate claims were handled externally. 
 150 Interview with Prosecutor 5 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with author). 
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This CIU attorney suggests that prosecutors accustomed to appellate 
review approach postconviction innocence review with a fundamentally 
different mindset.  Rather than consider the innocence claim on its merits, 
they identify procedural reasons (or “procedural landmines” as they were 
described by one innocence organization attorney)151 to justify rejecting it.152 
As for the suggestion that individual appellate prosecutors experience 
cognitive bias, an appellate prosecutor responded to this suggestion: 
At the end of the day I have the same interest as anybody else does. I don’t want the 
wrong person in jail, nor do I want the actual killer out on the street. So, I mean, I care 
about my cases and I care about what goes on with them . . . . And at some point, you 
have more knowledge of the case than a traditional person. Some of my cases…I’ve 
been involved for over ten years. I mean, you can’t replace that. But, of course, by the 
same token, somebody could say, “Oh, you looked at it for ten years, you’re jaded by 
that.” And I would disagree only knowing who I am. I’m not built that way.153 
While this prosecutor asserts his own impartiality, he simultaneously 
raises the source of his potential bias.  Having already reviewed previous 
versions of the defendant’s appeal, he has “more knowledge,” but his 
knowledge stems from having rejected the appeal in the past. 
Other CIU prosecutors spoke not of cognitive biases, but rather of rigid 
adherence to the adversarial nature of appellate procedure.  From this 
perspective, appellate prosecutors’ myopic behavior could be characterized 
without value judgment.  One described the attitude of the appeals division 
in her office as “How can I make this claim go away? How can I defeat this 
claim? How can I stand by the conviction?”154 Another explained: “You 
don’t have a [CIU] actually just kind of being an appellate unit or habeas 
unit.  They need to be distinct to look at different things a little bit more 
 
 151 Interview with Defense Attorney 1 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 152 For example, arguing that the evidence of innocence could have been discoverable at 
the time of trial. An innocence organization attorney explained: “When we’re talking about 
new evidence of innocence that wasn’t considered previously, there’s a lot of emphasis on, 
‘Well, it’s new, but couldn’t you have found this earlier?’ That kind of thing . . . . The only 
reason it wouldn’t have been brought out earlier is because you had a bad attorney. Otherwise 
somebody would have brought it out, or else it wasn’t find-able, one or the other. Either way, 
why should the person continue sitting in prison if either of those two happened?” Interview 
with Defense Attorney 4 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with author); see also 
Brooks et al., supra note 31, at 1050 (providing more on how this appellate strategy fails 
innocent defendants). 
 153 Interview with Prosecutor 21 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 154 Interview with Prosecutor 6 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with author). 
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holistically.”155  A third CIU prosecutor pointed to appellate deadlines, 
raising the possibility that appellate prosecutors may not have time to “look 
at different things a little bit more holistically.”  She explained: 
In some ways, I think it would be nice to be able to transition to an environment where 
Post-Conviction was cognizant of a lot of the same things that CIU does and had the 
ability to look at something a little harder. But they’ve got timetables and 
deadlines . . . we have more time to work on them.156 
Several defense attorney respondents also acknowledged the daily 
realities of the appeals division in a prosecutor’s office.  For example, an 
innocence organization attorney said of appellate prosecutors, “They get 
thousands of postconviction petitions by prisoners.  Most of them are 
frivolous.  They’re trying to find procedural ways to make them go away.  
That’s the main thing that they do.”157 
Furthermore, several prosecutor respondents characterized appeals as 
an undesirable assignment.  One appellate prosecutor said, “I try to explain 
to my friends what I really do. It’s like ‘so you do what? You’re looking at 
what? These are old cases? Who cares about these things?’”158  Another 
confessed, “I was actually hired under the no-whining clause. I had to agree 
to do appeals without whining for two years—without wanting to do trial 
work.”159  This common preference for trial work was substantiated when I 
asked a prosecutor who works in trials whether he had ever worked in 
appeals, and he responded, “No, thank goodness.”160 
Such comments suggest that appellate prosecutors’ work is not regarded 
in the office as exciting or rewarding.  Rather, appellate prosecutors are 
professionally socialized to “defeat the claim” and make it “go away.”161  
From this perspective, their rejection of innocence claims is less about 
psychological bias and more about meeting the demands of the appellate 
structure and schedule and responding to the expectations of their superiors. 
 
 155 Interview with Prosecutor 26 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 156 Interview with Prosecutor 37 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 157 Interview with Defense Attorney 4 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 158 Interview with Prosecutor 21 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 159 Interview with Prosecutor 32 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 160 Interview with Prosecutor 22 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 161 See supra note 135 and accompanying discussion. 
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If the goal of the appellate unit is to find legal arguments to undermine 
the appeal and maintain the conviction, then the CIU stands in direct contrast.  
The stated goal of the CIU is to identify and correct false convictions.162  
While CIU and defense attorneys accepted that these two units should serve 
separate functions, the case review processes that they described revealed 
complications in implementing this separation.  Such complications included 
difficulty transitioning cases between units and difficulty establishing the 
hierarchy of leadership between appeals and CIU. 
First, CIU prosecutors and defense attorney respondents spoke about the 
challenges of negotiating workflow between CIU and appellate divisions.  
When CIUs are first established, certain categories of postconviction 
innocence claims may be rerouted from appellate units to the new CIU.  In 
some offices, the CIU is developed as an extension of the appellate division.  
Two CIU prosecutors said that they continued to handle other types of 
postconviction claims, such as habeas petitions.  The main distinction is that 
traditional postconviction claims would be processed through the courts, 
whereas a CIU would also regularly handle claims out of court by working 
directly with defendants and their counsel.  A defense attorney respondent 
reported that the CIU attorneys in her jurisdiction brought their appellate 
caseload with them when they transferred to the CIU.  (CIU teams, including 
the chief prosecutor of the unit, were often culled from appellate divisions.)  
Respondents also described the opposite scenario, in which the appellate unit 
had retained some types of postconviction innocence claims even after the 
implementation of the CIU.  For defense attorneys, such seemingly 
bureaucratic decisions could portend the outcome of a claim.  As an 
innocence organization attorney lamented, “I have a case that went to the 
appeals unit, and they’re opposing us. Whereas if it had gone to the new 
[CIU], we would have a much better chance and opportunity.”163  This 
inability to redirect her client’s case to the newly established CIU ultimately 
led her to conclude that she would have to continue to pursue the appeal, and 
then submit it to the CIU if it failed in litigation. 
Difficulty transitioning cases between units endured after the CIU 
implementation as well.  In large jurisdictions with fully staffed CIUs, 
postconviction claims were maintained on a separate track.  CIU prosecutors 
spoke of sending rejected innocence claims to the postconviction section but 
rarely of having received claims from postconviction.  Advocating for a 
separation between the two units, prosecutors expressed concern for 
 
 162 See supra note 5. 
 163 Interview with Defense Attorney 3 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
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duplicating each other’s work.  Two CIU prosecutors explained that they 
would not, as a matter of office policy, consider claims that were 
simultaneously under review on appeal.  For example: 
We have a requirement that if your case is currently on appeal or currently in habeas, 
that we won’t look at it because you’re essentially splitting your office by having some 
people looking at it with the possibility of vacating a conviction while you have other 
people looking at it to uphold a conviction.164 
Meanwhile, the second CIU prosecutor voiced concern about this policy 
because “you don’t want to wait until it’s too late. You don’t want them to 
burn their one bite at the apple if we can also help.”165  These responses 
suggest that how and when a claim arrives in the office might influence a 
prosecutor’s response as much as the actual merit of the claim.  In the words 
of one public defense attorney, “Unless it gets in their little [CIU] they’re still 
fighting tooth and nail to save those convictions.”166  Innocence organization 
attorneys and others who regularly litigate postconviction claims might 
strategize exactly where in the prosecutor’s office they want their case to 
land; yet pro se defendants filing behind bars are much less likely to be able 
to predict the best course. 
Secondly, leadership hierarchies between the CIU and the appeals unit 
may undermine the independence of the CIU.  According to one innocence 
organization respondent, a “structural problem” arises when the CIU chief 
reports to the same person who supervises the appeals division.  This defense 
attorney reported that the chain of command ultimately resulted in appellate 
division review of innocence claims, regardless of CIU involvement.  As she 
described it, “If we just sat down at a table, I’m pretty confident we could do 
good work. [The CIU is] part of an institution, and there’s such institutional 
resistance.”167  The institutional resistance manifests in the executive 
decision about how to staff and supervise the CIU, which, in turn, influences 
the decision about the outcome of the claim. 
3. Other Approaches 
The size of the jurisdiction mattered in the prosecutors’ handling of 
innocence claims but did not appear to dictate the approach.  Prosecutors 
from small jurisdictions (population 500,000 or less), and medium 
 
 164 Interview with Prosecutor 26 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 165 Interview with Prosecutor 6 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with author). 
 166 Interview with Defense Attorney 12 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 167 Interview with Defense Attorney 36 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
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jurisdictions (population between 500,000 and one million) generally lacked 
the resources or the caseload to staff a full-time CIU168 or even a separate 
appellate division.  Instead, these respondents reported that postconviction 
innocence claims were either reviewed by the original trial prosecutor 
involved in the false conviction, a supervising trial attorney, or the elected 
district attorney.  In short, a variety of approaches were applied that 
demonstrated considerable ingenuity in structuring postconviction innocence 
review.  Clear guidelines had been established in some of these jurisdictions, 
while others’ responses to innocence claims were developed in response to a 
specific case and applied episodically.  Regardless of the approach, the 
office’s handling of innocence claims clearly reflected the decision-making 
and management style of the elected prosecutor. 
In the two smallest jurisdictions, the elected district attorney chose to 
personally review innocence claims.  As one of these elected prosecutors, a 
former defense attorney, explained, “I’m the one assigning my work, and to 
be honest, the cases intrigue me.”169  More commonly, district attorney 
respondents reported reviewing innocence claims on an ad hoc basis.  For 
example, one expressed an open-door policy for defense attorneys on 
postconviction claims, saying, “If there is a defense attorney that felt our 
appellate team wasn’t giving them the due diligence they should get, they can 
always bring it to a supervisor or my attention, too.”170 
Similarly, several defense attorneys described taking claims directly to 
the elected or to upper management—but only in the most extraordinary 
circumstances with the most meritorious cases.  For example, one public 
defense attorney had a personal connection to the district attorney and was 
able to approach him informally.  In another such example, the private 
defense attorney who submitted the case used to work at the prosecutor’s 
office.  He explained: 
Again, having worked in the district attorney’s office it is based upon almost a military 
chain of command. The prosecutors, the trial lawyers are lieutenants. And there are 
division chiefs, which are captains. Then there are majors who are over things. Then 
the District Attorney is like go and see the general or the president . . . . When you get 
 
 168 Three of the ten CIU prosecutor respondents worked in medium-sized jurisdictions, 
but these units did not handle wrongful conviction claims exclusively with full-time CIU 
attorneys. 
 169 Interview with Prosecutor 20 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 170 Interview with Prosecutor 34 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
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a case like [defendant]’s . . . you want to go to the top and talk with the top people about 
it.171 
Still, this straight-to-the-top strategy may backfire depending on the 
elected prosecutor’s own involvement with the original conviction. 
Indeed, two prosecuting attorney respondents reported that, in their 
office, innocence claims would be directed to the prosecutor who handled the 
underlying conviction.  In the face of a lack of data about how postconviction 
innocence claims are directed, some scholars have speculated that they might 
typically go to the trial attorney involved in the false conviction.172  
Therefore, the practice could be more widespread than the two offices in this 
sample would suggest.  Indeed, five defense attorney respondents related 
experiences in which the trial prosecutor had been tasked with responding to 
a claim of innocence.  A few of the cases resulted in exoneration but only 
after being removed from the trial prosecutors’ review.  Several additional 
defense attorneys encountered the trial prosecutor in other contexts, for 
example, at meetings in the district attorney’s office.  This public defense 
attorney raises one of the challenges of working with the original trial 
prosecutor on an innocence claim: 
The original trial prosecutor, who didn’t turn over the Brady material, who made 
arguments that were not supported by the evidence, was the one who was tasked to 
respond. Now that’s number one bad practice . . . . You really should not be having the 
trial prosecutor who worked on the case be the one who responds in the collateral 
proceeding.173 
This respondent highlights the potential conflict of interest inherent to 
assigning trial prosecutors to review their own cases.  Prosecutorial 
misconduct that does not appear on the trial record—such as concealing 
exculpatory evidence—is considered new evidence to be submitted during 
postconviction.174  One third of the prosecutor and defense attorney 
 
 171 Interview with Defense Attorney 28 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 172 E.g., MEDWED, supra note 7, at 128 (writing that many small prosecutors’ offices may 
assign postconviction petitions to the lawyer that handled the trial); Green & Yaroshefsky, 
supra note 2, at 494 (suggesting that prosecutors’ offices ordinarily refer new evidence of 
innocence to the trial prosecutor). 
 173 Interview with Defense Attorney 25 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 174 See King, supra note 34, at 258 (explaining how direct appeal does not review claims 
like ineffective assistance of counsel or the state’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, 
both of which are common contributors of wrongful conviction). 
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respondents described handling postconviction innocence claims involving 
Brady allegations.175 
In one medium-sized jurisdiction, the responsibility for reviewing 
innocence claims had recently been reassigned from the original trial 
prosecutor to a supervising trial prosecutor.  As the supervising trial 
prosecutor explained, “If I did something wrong the first time, to ask me to 
take a look at it and see if I did anything wrong, I’m probably going to say, 
‘Well no.’ Because I’m making the same mistake I made the first time.”176 
For this prosecutor, innocence review also functioned as a tool for 
evaluating the work product of the line prosecutors under him.  His direct 
communication with the elected district attorney provided him with decision-
making autonomy, and his status as the most experienced prosecutor in the 
office had prepared him to take on the responsibility.  In addition, he handled 
all postconviction innocence review claims, including those filed directly by 
prisoners as well as those submitted by defense attorneys. 
Another supervising trial prosecutor described a similar approach in his 
office but stipulated that he only reviewed claims received from innocence 
organizations.  In this system, the supervising trial prosecutor acts more as 
innocence organization liaison than reviewer of innocence claims.  Such 
processes appeared to be initiated in response to a particular case rather than 
guidelines developed as part of a systematic effort to identify false 
convictions.  In these processes, the supervising trial prosecutor became 
involved only after the claim had been vetted by an outside entity. 
Similarly, two innocence organization respondents reported that elected 
prosecutors had appointed a special prosecutor to handle innocence claims 
“with fresh eyes” on a case-by-case basis.177  One of the case reviews was 
assigned to a team of two prosecutors, one from the trial division and one 
from the appellate division.  In the other case, a supervising trial prosecutor 
conducted the investigation.  Both defense attorneys described appreciating 
the refreshing emphasis on factual, rather than procedural, issues: 
 
 175 A private defense attorney estimated that about 80% of his postconviction case load 
included a Brady allegation. He explained the prosecutors’ response: “If a Brady violation 
occurred, it has to be dealt with. You can’t just sweep it under the rug. I think it does put 
[prosecutors] in an almost immediate defensive mode because they’re sitting there thinking, 
okay, a Brady case. We’re going to have to start gathering the troops now.” Interview with 
Defense Attorney 2 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with author). 
 176 Interview with Prosecutor 19 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 177 Interview with Defense Attorney 8 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
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They actually were charged with independently reviewing whether this was a valid 
conviction and really focused on the evidence. He wanted to know, do you think that 
[the defendant] did it or not?178 
Let me say, it’s very similar to what conviction integrity units do, right? Because… the 
conviction integrity units, they’re not worried as much about whether there are claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. They’re saying like, what are our facts? Do the 
facts portray a potential mistake here?179 
Therefore, even in jurisdictions that lacked the resources (or the 
caseload) to devote to a standing CIU, prosecutors were able to achieve 
objective postconviction innocence review processes.  Nevertheless, such 
processes must be distinguished from CIUs by their episodic nature.  
Although the actual investigation and case review may resemble the 
processes implemented by CIU—and in fact, innocence review 
investigations predate the creation of the first CIU180—they may not share 
the same systematized approach or public transparency of a good faith CIU.  
A district attorney’s decision to initiate such an investigation would still be 
highly discretionary. 
One district attorney respondent from a medium-sized jurisdiction 
described how he had attempted to create postconviction innocence review 
practices that would be both systematized and unbiased.  His solution 
involved soliciting feedback from volunteer, external legal professionals on 
all cases under consideration for innocence review by his office.  His 
comments highlight the obstacles to achieving impartiality in many 
jurisdictions. As he explained: 
I see some concerns in terms of the bias issue because in my office, there’s [a small 
number of] attorneys. Everybody knows each other, respects each other. We function 
like a big family here, which is all good. The downside to that is if I’m called upon to 
review a case from somebody that I know personally, I’m going into that review biased. 
It’s a natural thing. It’s hard to get around that in over probably 90% of prosecutor’s 
offices in the country.181 
 
 178 Id. 
 179 Interview with Defense Attorney 1 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 180 See Medwed, supra note 1, at 126 (describing the proactive assistance of the St. Paul, 
Minnesota, District Attorney Susan Gaertner in a 2002 DNA exoneration. He writes, “for the 
first time, a local district attorney’s office had initiated the process that led to the exoneration 
rather than members of the defense team.”); see also Chandler, supra note 91, at 14 (citing an 
even earlier effort out of San Diego County when a Deputy District Attorney and DNA expert 
there sent letters to “hundreds of convicted persons, offering to test the DNA evidence in their 
disposed cases”). 
 181 Interview with Prosecutor 35 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with the 
author). 
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This respondent was unique for addressing his own potential for bias in 
postconviction case review so directly.  His previous experience litigating 
appeals as a defense attorney may have contributed to this perspective. 
In summary, both prosecutors and defense attorney respondents 
underscored the salience of the decision about who should conduct 
postconviction innocence review.182  The size of the jurisdiction influenced 
the options available but did not predict the decision.183  Most prosecutors 
from large jurisdictions reported having implemented CIUs or handling 
innocence claims through their appellate divisions.  Prosecutor respondents 
from small and medium-sized jurisdictions described a wider variety of 
approaches, though these approaches were more likely developed in response 
to a specific innocence claim (or set of claims) rather than established as 
protocols to follow as systematically.184  Among the approaches overall, 
some acknowledged the potential for bias more than others.185  Prosecutors 
in large jurisdictions described the risk for cognitive bias among appellate 
prosecutors or an appellate mindset reflective of professional socialization 
and the constraints of the postconviction appeals process.186  Reconciling the 
relationship between innocence review and the traditional appellate 
postconviction process emerged as a primary point of differentiation between 
processes.187  Some jurisdictions sought to establish a strict separation 
between the two types of review but found the separation difficult to maintain 
in practice.188  In small and medium jurisdictions, where small staffs 
produced greater familiarity among prosecutors, bias was described more in 
terms of a personal conflict of interest.189  At the same time, elected 
prosecutors had developed a variety of creative solutions to establish 
objective review: appointing special prosecutors to review cases on an ad hoc 
basis, tasking supervisory trial prosecutors with innocence review, and 
seeking feedback from external reviewers.190 
Respondents described how the route chosen for postconviction 
innocence claims shaped the handling of the claim—chiefly, CIUs as 
compared to appellate divisions, and appellate divisions as compared to 
 
 182 See supra Section III.A. 
 183 See supra Section III.A.3. 
 184 See supra Section III.A.3. 
 185 See supra Section III.A. 
 186 See supra Section III.A.2. 
 187 See supra Section III.A.2. 
 188 See supra Section III.A.2. 
 189 See supra Section III.A.3. 
 190 See supra Section III.A.3. 
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district attorney or supervising trial attorney review.191  Therefore, before a 
claim even arrives in the office, important decisions influencing its success 
or failure have already been made by the elected prosecutor and the executive 
team.192  Once processes have been established, individual prosecutors then 
decide whether or not to pursue any given claim.193 
B. SCREENING DECISIONS 
While executive decisions clearly determined which prosecutor would 
be tasked with reviewing innocence claims, individual “worker” prosecutors 
had more discretionary power to determine screening decisions, such as 
whether an innocence claim would be pursued for investigation and review.  
Still, even these individual decisions were shaped by the expectations of the 
executive team and the constraints imposed by the postconviction appeals 
system.  The estimated number of postconviction innocence claims that 
prosecutors received varied from one office to the next and, indeed, was 
seldom tracked.  The difficulty in keeping track—particularly for those 
offices lacking a CIU—arose partially from the ambiguity about what was 
meant by “post-conviction innocence claim.”  Prosecutors’ in these offices 
often defined an innocence claim as one that had transcended the 
postconviction haystack—having been received by an innocence 
organization, for example.  Therefore, a pro se, postconviction motion 
claiming innocence would not uniformly be considered an innocence claim. 
Prosecutors reported innocence claims as deriving from a wide variety 
of sources: prisoners and parolees, family members and other advocates, 
defense attorneys, judges, other prosecutors, and reporters.  Four of the 
prosecutor respondents also described reviewing cases for forensic error or 
police misconduct in the wake of some discovery of wrongdoing.  According 
to prosecutor respondents, however, the majority of innocence claims took 
the form of pro se appeals or a letter sent directly from a prisoner or prisoner’s 
family member.  The shorthand for this type of intake, “jail mail,”194 reveals 
the potential stigma attributed to the return address.  Since defendants in the 
postconviction stages are not entitled to defense counsel in most states,195 a 
large volume of pro se claims is inevitable.  Moreover, it stands to reason that 
such claims will have increased along with the increasing length of custodial 
 
 191 See supra Section III.A. 
 192 See supra Section III.A. 
 193 See infra Section III.B. 
 194 Interview with Prosecutor 6 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with author). 
 195 See Findley, supra note 40, at 605. 
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sentences; prisoners may now be more likely to reach the postconviction 
stage while still behind bars.196 
Only the CIU prosecutors described the processes involved in actually 
responding to every claim.  They provided examples of the types of claims 
that could be quickly screened out, such as requests for assistance with a 
conviction outside the jurisdiction and requests for a sentence reduction 
rather than an innocence investigation.  All CIU prosecutors received 
requests like these that fell outside the purview of the unit.  Some CIU 
prosecutors also described limiting case selection in various ways, such as by 
imposing the following requirements: that cases must have gone to trial; that 
cases must involve serious, violent felonies; that defendants must still be in 
custody; that defendants must have defense counsel; and that cases must have 
a forensic hook.  Claims not meeting these eligibility criteria could be 
screened out.  All other requests for assistance, “jail mail” or otherwise, 
would receive some type of response, usually a request for more information 
or a recommendation that the defendant secure counsel.  Rather than provide 
estimates of the total number of postconviction innocence claims received, 
CIU prosecutors in smaller jurisdictions offered the total number of cases 
that had been reviewed since the CIU’s implementation (these ranged from 
four197 to “less than 30 or 40”198).  CIU prosecutors in larger jurisdictions 
offered the number currently being reviewed (these ranged from forty-four199 
to 200200).  However, not all prosecutors were able to provide these numbers. 
CIU attorneys’ descriptions of intake processes in large jurisdictions 
revealed the logistical challenges of pursuing pro se claims.  Despite the large 
number of requests from prisoners claiming innocence, respondents reported 
that few followed up after their initial inquiry.  When pro se claimants did 
respond, the process was still inevitably delayed due to the lagged 
 
 196 As one public defense attorney explained: “With the stiffening of the sentences both 
at the federal levels and the 1986 sentencing commission and the big uptick in the federal 
sentences and similarly in the states. Now the sentences were getting much longer all the way 
across the board. So the number of cases went way up . . . So everybody was really scrambling 
just to keep up with those two surges[.]” Interview with Defense Attorney 30 (confidential 
unpublished interview) (on file with author). 
 197 Interview with Prosecutor 29 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 198 Interview with Prosecutor 35 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 199 Interview with Prosecutor 24 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 200 Interview with Prosecutor 27 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
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communication.  In theory, all claims were treated fairly; in practice, some 
claims could be handled more readily than others. 
Several CIU prosecutors in large jurisdictions receiving a high volume 
of postconviction innocence claims spoke of a triage system201 in which 
defense attorney claims took priority: “Part of me when I first started is like, 
‘I’m going to look at every single case and I’m going to give everyone the 
same kind of consideration.’ You really can’t do that just because the 
resources aren’t available, and you have to learn how to triage the cases.” 
She added: 
I still think it’s kind of unfair that just because someone has an attorney that maybe 
their cases jump to the front of the line. We used to do things as they came in, but then 
we had to triage things more because we had so much coming in, we have to look at 
the ones . . . where we might be doing something on the case, giving relief.202 
As this CIU prosecutor explained, time spent on meritless claims came 
at the cost of delaying review for those actually innocent people waiting to 
have their claims considered.  Put simply, “if you get too bogged down in 
every case, you’re never going to find the ones that matter.”203  Such 
statements suggest the CIU prosecutors’ willingness to identify false 
convictions, even if they are not able to provide the same level of review to 
every claim. 
In contrast, some non-CIU prosecutors openly expressed skepticism 
about pro se innocence claims: “Unfortunately, everyone claims they didn’t 
do it;”204 “The vast majority of these claims are filed pro se by defendants, 
and they have absolutely no merit to them, and you can tell that they’ve 
traded some cigarettes to somebody for a form that they’ve filled in the 
blanks on;”205 “When I say merit, I mean it’s not a laughably ridiculous 
position.”206 
 
 201 The practice of prioritizing certain cases over others, or triaging, has been a subject of 
legal research on public defenders in earlier stages of criminal justice system processing. See 
generally L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender 
Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626 (2013) (presenting a framework for public defender triage that 
seeks to minimize implicit bias). 
 202 Interview with Prosecutor 27 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 203 Interview with Prosecutor 37 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 204 Interview with Prosecutor 21 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 205 Interview with Prosecutor 19 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 206 Interview with Prosecutor 32 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
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Compare the challenges and frustrations that prosecutors described with 
pro se claims to the relative ease they experienced when receiving cases from 
trusted defense attorneys.  These defense attorneys had already vetted the 
case, they could anticipate questions and challenges, and they could present 
the legal arguments in a cogent, skilled manner.  Prosecutors could readily 
meet with defense attorneys, share information, and learn about the status of 
the case through qualified counsel proficient in legal negotiations.  Eleven 
respondents (both defense attorneys and prosecutors) said that the defense 
had presented their cases to prosecutors in person.  Most often, the defense 
team came to the prosecutors’ offices to pitch the cases rather than hosting 
the prosecutors.  At this pitch meeting, defense could identify credible 
potential errors in the conviction; they could share results of their initial 
reinvestigation; and they could answer prosecutors’ questions on the spot. 
Such opportunities are simply not available to defendants and their family 
members.  The distinction is made clear in this private defense attorney’s 
description of his presentation to prosecutors: 
Prosecutors are going to think that every defendant is going to profess and claim his 
innocence over and over again. If it were just based upon [the defendant] coming back 
and saying, “yeah, I didn’t do this and somebody else did it.” But again, this was a lot 
of detective work. When you lay all this out to them, showed them the pictures . . . . and 
laid this out in a cognitive, organized, objective analysis, they came pretty quickly to 
the conclusion that this needed to be undone.207 
The private defense attorney in this case was well known to the 
prosecution through his previous professional experience as a prosecutor.  In 
fact, the defendant had previously filed a pro se postconviction motion, but 
these appeals had failed.  Without the means to afford a private defense 
attorney, the defendant likely would not have prevailed, and the error would 
have never been discovered. 
The limitations of postconviction processes for actually innocent 
defendants led one CIU prosecutor to describe the work of CIUs as a “last 
resort.”208  She explained: 
If all else fails, you’ve got the [CIU]. That’s really where I see us going at this point is 
that we are really a last resort option. Because if you think about it, if you follow a 
postconviction, that’s adversarial. We’re there to defend our conviction. It’s adversarial 
by nature. Not everything can be resolved outside of the courtroom. However, let’s say 
that the information or the evidence that you have doesn’t fit squarely in that 
postconviction arena, as in maybe you’ve already had your postconviction. Maybe your 
 
 207 Interview with Defense Attorney 28 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 208 Interview with Prosecutor 33 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
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attorney, while their performance wasn’t something that was super star worthy, you’re 
not entitled to the best defense possible.209 
By the time this CIU learned about the case through innocence 
organization attorneys, the defendant had exhausted his appeals.  His 
postconviction petition had been denied.  To its credit, the CIU devoted an 
extraordinary amount of attention to this case.  However, by then, many years 
had passed since the defendant’s false conviction and failed appeals.  If 
innocence claims are those that do not “fit squarely in that postconviction 
arena,”210 then every stage prior to innocence review will initiate an 
adversarial response.  Thus, CIU review is established in opposition to 
traditional postconviction review.  The danger here is that prosecutors 
engaged in CIU review may reflexively perceive procedural claims—such as 
ineffective assistance of counsel—as falling into the 
appellate/postconviction/habeas pool rather than the actual innocence pool. 
Defendants can, of course, be factually innocent and also have suffered from 
procedural flaws at trial. 
Prosecutor respondents rarely mentioned the time or procedural hassles 
involved for defendants.  However, two non-CIU veteran prosecutors 
acknowledged that defendants they helped exonerate had been writing to 
their office for years prior to any substantial consideration.  One said, “[he] 
had been writing to me for, oh my god, 20 years. ‘I’m innocent. I’m 
innocent,’ all this stuff . . . . anyway, I took the case.”211  Another described 
the defendant as “a fairly active pro se litigant . . . I actually recognized his 
name just because he filed lots of papers.”212  In both instances, falsely 
convicted defendants spent years trying to prevail upon the prosecutors’ 
office before their claim was reviewed.  A less persistent defendant, 
especially one who had been released in the intervening years, might have 
been overlooked entirely.  These three prosecutor respondents suggest that 
the persistence of the defendant, as demonstrated through his failure to 
receive consideration on appeal, had become a de facto requirement for 
review. 
Still, a few prosecutors, both CIU and non-CIU, related efforts that they 
had taken on behalf of pro se claimants that had fizzled out.213  A few others 
 
 209 Interview with Prosecutor 33 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 210 See supra note 173. 
 211 Interview with Prosecutor 17 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 212 Interview with Prosecutor 9 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with author). 
 213 For example, a prisoner asked CIU Prosecutor 29 to interview a witness that he claimed 
would substantiate his claim of innocence. Instead, the witness admitted that the prisoner had 
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independently helped exonerate pro se defendants.  A closer look at these 
three exoneration cases, however, reveals that each provided an external 
incentive to assist, which may have allowed the claim to supersede the usual 
reluctance to engage pro se claimants.  For example, in one of the cases, the 
district attorney happened to be engaged in the prosecution of the actual 
perpetrator of the crime when he received the innocent prisoner’s letter.  The 
claimant’s description of the evidence led him to realize that the case may 
have been connected to the one that he was currently prosecuting.  In another 
case, the defendant’s innocence claims had already been reported in the 
media, generating popular support for the defendant.  In the third case, a 
credible victim—who had no previous relationship to the defendant—
regretted her testimony and recanted her statements. 
In summary, the context of the appellate structure, specifically, the lack 
of representation for postconviction claimants leading to a profusion of pro 
se claims, appeared to shape prosecutors’ case selection decisions.214  
Further, prosecutors tended to direct their role obligation towards those 
claimants who had already exhausted alternative options.215  Although CIU 
prosecutors demonstrated a greater sense of responsibility in responding to 
requests, all prosecutor respondents expressed the strong preference to work 
with trusted defense attorneys or innocence organization attorneys and 
described the challenges of working with pro se claimants as nearly 
insurmountable.216 
C. DETERMINING THE OUTCOME 
In contrast to the rapid decision-making of earlier stages—for example, 
charging and plea bargaining—individual “worker” prosecutors are not 
empowered to determine the outcome of an innocence review or innocence 
investigation.  As one appellate prosecutor respondent explained, “Letting 
somebody out of prison is not something a line prosecutor has the power to 
do.”217  An innocence organization respondent described the “line 
prosecutor” position: 
Not a supervisor, not the elected person, but someone who’s on the front lines doing 
the cases.  When you look at a legal brief, usually if you see a bunch of names on it, 
 
asked him to fabricate the story to get his mother off his back. Interview with Prosecutor 29 
(confidential unpublished interview) (on file with author). 
 214 See supra Section III.B. 
 215 See supra Section III.B. 
 216 See supra Section III.B. 
 217 Interview with Prosecutor 32 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
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the top person is the highest in the office hierarchy, the bottom person is the one who 
actually did the work, that’s usually the line attorney.218 
In the context of the postconviction arena, even a CIU chief may lack 
discretion. 
Defense attorney respondents often characterized the limited discretion 
as a hindrance that caused delays in case resolution and complicated 
communication with the district attorneys’ office.  As the following quotes 
demonstrate, some defense attorneys regretted having to gain the approval of 
upper management whom they believed to be less likely to agree to relief: 
Line prosecutors . . . they don’t get to make decisions. They’re down here, and 
someone above them has to approve it, so they may want to do the right thing. They 
just don’t have the authority to do it . . . . They’re not going to tank the prosecution 
because then they’ll get fired.219 
He may actually see the merits in the cases, but he’s constantly trying to figure out how 
he’s going to defend his action of “letting somebody go”—is the way they see it—to 
his higher ups.220 
The associate DAs that you’re going to deal with are very fearful of the elected DA and 
they don’t want to cross them . . . . Their job is at the whim of the elected DA whether 
they’re going to keep their job or not.221 
To summarize the three, line prosecutors may want to “do the right 
thing” by “letting somebody go” but their job security depends on the elected 
DA’s “whims.”  These defense attorneys believed that job insecurity and a 
desire to satisfy the boss drove the prosecutors’ responses rather than their 
genuine impressions about the merits of the innocence claim. 
A public defense attorney conveyed similar sentiments.  In this case, he 
suspected that the challenges he experienced communicating with the CIU 
prosecutor may have been a reflection of the inconsistent messages she 
received from higher ups: 
She’s like, ‘I still got to talk to my supervisors, but I don’t think anything is gonna 
happen.’ I’m like, ‘okay fine.’ So, then the next call I get from her is much more 
positive . . . . It was basically like which higher up she spoke to that day. You know, 
 
 218 Interview with Defense Attorney 4 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 219 Interview with Defense Attorney 12 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 220 Interview with Defense Attorney 36 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
 221 Interview with Defense Attorney 2 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
author). 
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maybe one higher up was in favor of [reinvestigating the case] and one higher up 
wasn’t. I don’t know, but she went back and forth. It was really crazy.222 
Defense attorneys often expressed frustration with the need to relay 
communication through the line prosecutor, and the delays that this caused 
in resolving the case.  Some wished that they could go above the line 
prosecutors and communicate directly with the executive team.  For example, 
one private defense attorney explained, “In this business, you just have to 
recognize that you’re dealing with a person who has no authority to make a 
decision, and there’s nothing to be gained by trying to get mad at them or put 
them in a spot.”223 
While this attorney suggests the need for collegiality when dealing with 
line prosecutors, he also acknowledges the tendency to “get mad” when 
“dealing with a person who has no authority to make a decision.”224 
Prosecutor respondents accepted that the final decision would be left to 
the district attorney.  Supervising, senior trial prosecutors tasked with 
innocence review voiced a greater sense of vertical autonomy than did CIU 
prosecutors or appellate prosecutors.  As one stated, “I acknowledge that I 
work for someone else, but he gives me an awful lot of authority and 
discretion.”225  CIU prosecutor respondents explained that after leading the 
reinvestigation or case review, they would make a recommendation about the 
best course of action.226  According to this CIU attorney, “These decisions 
concerning exoneration are always a big deal. And they usually are going to 
involve multiple points of view. We’ve had internal disagreements in 
cases . . . and ultimately the DA will then make the decision of what he or 
she wants to do.”227 
CIU prosecutors, like this one, reported making outcome decisions with 
a team of attorneys.  Typically, this took the form of an extended meeting (or 
even series of meetings) involving a group of attorneys selected and 
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assembled by the district attorney.  Respondents described meetings 
involving the CIU attorney, deputy attorneys, appellate attorneys, the trial 
prosecutor, and even the defense attorney.228  This meeting, termed 
“DEFCON 5”229 by one CIU attorney,230 culminated in a decision about 
whether or not the prosecution would agree to dismiss the defendant’s 
conviction or grant some other form of relief.  “Internal disagreements” can 
be explored through DEFCON 5.  In the following description of the process, 
the CIU prosecutor reported that the district attorney had assembled the entire 
CIU, the executive staff, a team member specializing in policy, and a team 
member specializing in ethics: 
The district attorney is going to want all the facts. She’s going to have questions. Let’s 
say it’s an investigation I ran. I’ll be sitting there just answering questions, giving my 
opinion and obviously my recommendation. We don’t always agree . . . . These 
discussions are very beneficial . . . . It’s a lot of thinking. It’s a lot of caring. I don’t 
think anyone realizes how much of that is done.231 
For this CIU prosecutor, the critical analysis of the evidence and the 
recommendation—under the strong leadership of the district attorney—
helped ensure full deliberation in the final decision. 
However, other CIU prosecutors and defense attorney respondents 
described how disagreements over cases could lead to office discord.  These 
prosecutors feared that their recommendations for relief would not survive 
the dissent within the ranks.  One innocence organization attorney who had 
attended a DEFCON 5 meeting described how the decision was resolved in 
spite of the trial prosecutor’s objection. The prosecutor who had originally 
tried the case “was very adamant that she had not gotten the wrong guy.”232  
Likewise, two CIU prosecutors reported that the trial prosecutor was always 
invited to weigh in at the final decision meeting.  Others reported that 
attorneys from the appellate division would be invited to attend.  Therefore, 
team meetings may put the CIU attorney in the position of justifying her 
recommendation to dismiss the conviction to colleagues who have a stake in 
upholding the conviction.  For example, one CIU prosecutor spent months 
 
 228 Two defense attorney respondents described attending a meeting at which an outcome 
decision was expected to be made. Interviews with Defense Attorney 3, 25 (confidential 
unpublished interviews) (on file with author). 
 229 DEFCON 5 refers to “DEFense readiness CONdition,” a system employed in the 
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 230 Interview with Prosecutor 27 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
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 231 Interview with Prosecutor 27 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
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 232 Interview with Defense Attorney 3 (confidential unpublished interview) (on file with 
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investigating an innocence claim (for which her office invested considerable 
resources) only to have the appellate division attorneys nearly succeed in 
undermining her recommendation that the defendant be exonerated.233 
In all but four of the jurisdictions,234 the prosecutor and members of the 
executive team made the final decision about the outcome of a postconviction 
innocence claim, while line prosecutors conducted the case review and the 
reinvestigation.  In every CIU case decision described here, multiple 
attorneys—some with countervailing interests—were consulted in the final 
decision.  Therefore, these prosecutors who were consulted for the final 
review also had the potential to influence the final outcome.  Relatedly, the 
limited decision-making power among line prosecutors—including CIU 
attorneys—frustrated some defense attorneys who communicated mainly 
with these line prosecutors, and not with the final decision-makers.  Some 
defense attorneys attributed the opacity of prosecutors’ decision-making 
processes to these hierarchical dynamics. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
This study examines postconviction innocence review practices among 
a sample of prosecutors’ offices where false convictions have been 
successfully identified and remedied.  It has explored how multiple levels of 
decision-making—from the courts and lawmakers, to district attorneys and 
their executive teams, to individual line prosecutors—guide salient decisions 
such as who will be tasked with innocence review,235 how cases will be 
screened,236 and how outcomes will be determined.237  In light of the 
difficulty discovering criminal justice system accidents as compared to other 
high-risk fields,238 and compounded by the failings of judicial review for 
factually innocent defendants,239 prosecutorial ability to identify error takes 
on special significance.  The ability of the individual prosecutor—the 
worker—to identify such errors can best be understood within the context of 
workplace practices and organizational principles.240 
The study draws from a sample of both CIU and non-CIU attorneys, 
therefore enabling comparisons between CIU processes and non-CIU 
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processes.  While CIU offers a more systematized approach through case 
screening and the ability to handle large-scale case reviews, small and 
medium-sized jurisdictions accomplished objective innocence review on a 
case-by-case basis.241  Both CIU and non-CIU processes reflected the 
influence of the appellate process as manifested in the challenges of 
separation between innocence review and appellate review,242 the risk of 
appellate attorney bias,243 and the disadvantage to pro se defendants.244  The 
appellate structure influenced how prosecutors perceived their role 
obligations towards postconviction innocence claims.245  The profusion of 
pro se claims and the belated consideration of new evidence shaped a 
preference for cases handled by innocence organizations and other trusted 
defense attorneys in both types of offices.  In sum, prosecutors’ 
postconviction efforts overall did not appear likely to benefit pro se 
defendants or to identify false convictions that had not already been identified 
by capable defense and/or adopted by journalists.246  Prosecutors conducting 
innocence claim reviews, or establishing structures for others to conduct such 
reviews, do so in the context of a system that emphasizes procedural errors 
over factual ones and that allows for a narrow and belated discovery of false 
convictions.247  Although every one of the prosecutors’ offices described here 
contributed to an exoneration, some workplace organizational structures 
seemed to enable more sustainable and unbiased innocence review than 
others.248 
Some offices appeared to rely upon the postconviction model, even 
when conducting innocence review.249  Selecting the original trial prosecutor 
to review her own case mirrors the process for judicial review.250  Despite the 
potential for bias, appellate practice has normalized this course by directing 
postconviction claims to the trial judge.251  Such actors may be subject to 
cognitive bias such as hindsight and outcome bias252—having believed in the 
defendant’s guilt once, they are more likely to view the outcome of his 
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conviction as correct.253  They may also be presented with conflicts of interest 
in the form of Brady allegations or other types of prosecutorial misconduct 
in which the trial prosecutor reviewing the claim would have a vested interest 
in denying the allegation and upholding the conviction.254  When trial 
prosecutors do not conduct the case review, but are nonetheless consulted 
about a potential false conviction case,255 these same conflicts may also arise. 
CIU prosecutors and defense attorney respondents also suggested that 
the appellate prosecutor can be limited in their outlook through their 
professional focus on procedural errors and biased through their personal 
familiarity with individual appellants.256  Rather than being empowered with 
a sense of their role obligation as a safeguard against false convictions, a 
righter-of-wrongs, or a “minister of justice,”257 appellate prosecutors are 
assumed to adopt an adversarial posture.258  Respondents’ statements suggest 
that appellate prosecutors fail to identify factual errors because their 
professional socialization discourages objective case review.259 
For their part, CIU attorneys argue that they serve a distinct function 
that is not met through traditional postconviction review.260  Indeed, 
recommendations for CIU best practices suggests maintaining separation 
from the appeals division.261  However, the challenges of implementing this 
separation in practice became apparent through respondents’ remarks.262 
Office structure and hierarchy, supervision of the CIU, and interoffice case 
flow each served to threaten the independence and efficacy of the CIU.263 
Therefore, despite respondents’ misgivings, it may be worthwhile to 
consider the possible benefits of involving appellate attorneys in 
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postconviction innocence review.  Could improved communication between 
postconviction units and CIUs facilitate discovery of potential false 
convictions under the right circumstances?  Appellate prosecutors might 
have an advantage through their knowledge of the relevant case law and their 
experience with the judicial review process.  They may more readily identify 
common, underlying problems across petitions, including bad actors or bad 
procedures.  They may recognize persistent defendants who steadfastly 
maintain innocence.  They may signal problem cases sooner, under direct 
appeal, reducing the delay between false conviction and exoneration. 
For inexperienced prosecutors, appeals could provide an opportunity to 
learn about courtroom dynamics before arguing cases in court.264  If such 
prosecutors are rewarded for objectively considering the merits of 
postconviction claims, rather than encouraged to consistently assume an 
adversarial response, they may serve the important function of flagging cases 
for innocence review.265  A rigidly hierarchical structure may, in fact, stifle 
the discovery of errors if subordinates are afraid to come forward.266  In small 
jurisdictions lacking an appellate division, line prosecutors could be 
encouraged to bring false conviction claims to the attention of their superiors, 
whether these were received through “jail mail” or originated from innocence 
organizations. 
A. REFORMS FOR PROSECUTORS’ OFFICES 
Chief prosecutors bear the responsibility for the final outcome decision 
in a postconviction innocence reinvestigation.  Since few chief prosecutors 
are able to spearhead reinvestigations personally, they must delegate 
responsibility to staff attorneys who have no stake in the final outcome and, 
ideally, no prior experience with the claims either in the appellate or trial 
context.  In CIU offices, appellate prosecutors could help identify potential 
false convictions and file for extension if more time is needed to pursue the 
 
 264 The career path of respondent prosecutors varied considerably, however, three of them 
reported that their initial placement in the district attorney’s office had been in an appellate 
division. 
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claim out of court.  This arrangement need not require appellate prosecutors 
to be further involved in the case review.  In non-CIU offices, postconviction 
innocence review could be assigned to a supervising trial prosecutor—
provided that she did not secure the original conviction and so long as she 
did not default to reviewing only those claims pre-vetted by innocence 
organizations.267 
Therefore, in both CIU and non-CIU offices, appellate and other line 
prosecutors reviewing postconviction claims could be trained to recognize 
correlates of false conviction.  These correlates may vary by jurisdiction and 
need not be limited to the canonical list offered by innocence organizations 
(eyewitness misidentification, false confessions, forensic error, etc.).268  
Rather, jurisdictional variation may produce patterns such as misuse of 
specific informants, reliance on outdated forensic disciplines, testimony of 
discredited police officers, and more.269  Prosecutor-initiated internal case 
audits have exonerated dozens of wrongfully convicted men and women 
following exposure of police misconduct.270  Local prosecutors’ offices are 
well positioned to identify problematic actors, conduct internal reviews, and 
create “no call” lists so that discredited officers and analysts will not be asked 
to testify.271  Prosecutors’ heightened attention to these potential errors on a 
systematic, ongoing basis makes excellent use of the prosecutorial function 
as a safeguard. 
First, prosecutors should recognize the possibility of a meritorious pro 
se claim, not just those claims receiving the extraordinary advocacy of 
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innocence organizations and other specialized postconviction attorneys.  
While it may be true that most postconviction pro se claims will lack merit, 
it is also true that many exonerated defendants have filed such claims and 
failed, in spite of their innocence.272  Prosecutors screening postconviction 
claims might be trained in the objective triage practices recommended for 
public defenders by Richardson and Goff.273  These practices include 
avoiding preconceptions about the possibility of factual innocence, creating 
checklists to use when evaluating cases, and collecting data about their own 
decision-making.274  Given the heavy volume of cases that each attorney 
receives, written guidelines about how to screen and how to track decisions 
may help prevent bias and promote more purposeful, consistent decision-
making.275 
Boehm suggests that prosecutors take up the triage approach by 
handling claims from those with the most serious offenses or the longest 
sentences first.276  By prioritizing claims from innocence organizations and 
postconviction defense attorneys, however, this is not quite what prosecutors 
are doing.  Although innocence organizations themselves tend to prioritize 
serious convictions with lengthy sentences, not every case with this urgent 
level of need will be accepted by the innocence organization.  Some states do 
not have a resident innocence organization,277 and the one that they do have 
may barely be able to keep up with the demand.  Some innocence 
organizations only accept certain types of cases, for example, those with the 
possibility of exculpatory postconviction DNA testing.278  Although some 
 
 272 See GARRETT, supra note 41, at 196 (studying the subset of the first 250 DNA 
exonerations in which written judicial opinions could be located—165 cases. Of these 165 
cases, 43% of defendants filed postconviction petitions and 21% filed federal habeas 
petitions). 
 273 Richardson & Goff, supra note 201, at 2644–45 (recommending establishing objective 
triage standards and maintaining accountability by tracking data about cases). 
 274 See id. at 2641–48. 
 275 See id. 
 276 Boehm, supra note 80, at 663. 
 277 See MAP OF INNOCENCE NETWORK MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS, https://innocencenet
work.org/members/#map [https://perma.cc/FDR5-Z4EU] (showing Innocence Network 
member directory map for states with an Innocence Network member organization). The 
Innocence Network is an international affiliation of innocence organizations. As of this 
writing, states without members appear to include North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, 
Nebraska, Kansas, Nevada, South Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, 
Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. 
 278 See, e.g., INNOCENCE PROJECT, SUBMIT A CASE, https://www.innocenceproject.org/
submit-case/ [https://perma.cc/M77B-YLYY] (providing a list of restrictions on case 
acceptance, including: “The Innocence Project does NOT review claims where DNA testing 
cannot prove innocence.”). 
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prosecutor respondents asserted that their state innocence organizations 
could be relied upon exclusively, such conditions are sure to be regional and 
conditional upon funding.  Some innocence organizations struggle to make 
ends meet through grants and private donations.279  Innocence organizations 
cannot always be depended upon as a fail-safe for innocent defendants in 
most states,280 and private attorney fees are out of reach for most 
defendants.281 
Whatever practices prosecutors’ offices employ, internal and external 
transparency is critical.  A wide range of variables such as jurisdiction size,282 
existing state remedies for postconviction innocence review,283 role of the 
Attorney General,284 budgetary constraints,285 presence of local innocence 
organization(s),286 and more, will necessarily produce a heterogeneity of 
 
 279 See MEDWED, supra note 7, at 136 (“The very survival of an innocence project may 
depend on luck, on the goodwill of a smattering of donors and law school deans.”). 
 280 See supra notes 277, 279. 
 281 One of the five private defense attorneys interviewed approached the topic of private 
attorney fees for postconviction clients, saying, “One thing I found out from wading into this 
[postconviction] work is that it’s extremely time consuming if you’re trying to do it as a solo 
practitioner. When I first got into this, the minimum fee I kept getting quoted is $25,000. I 
thought, I can do it for less than that but really, that would be foolhardy. Of course, most 
people in these situations don’t have $25,000. I told a lot of people to call the [LOCAL 
INNOCENCE ORGANIZATION] or here and there. They get full up, you know, they can’t 
take anymore.” Interview with Defense Attorney 2 (confidential unpublished interview) (on 
file with author). 
 282 For example, smaller jurisdictions may not have the resources or the caseload to justify 
creating a CIU. Hollway, supra note 95, at 21 (“It should be noted, though, that many smaller 
state or local prosecutors’ offices may lack the resources to separately staff a CRU.”). 
 283 For an overview of the variation in state remedies, see Brooks et al., supra note 31, at 
1078 (recognizing states such as California, Connecticut, Illinois, New Mexico and New York 
which “have explicitly recognized the right to a freestanding claim of actual innocence” and 
noting that still other states treat postconviction newly discovered evidence claims as 
synonymous to actual innocence claims); Leventhal, supra note 31, at 1477 (discussing the 
states that recognize “freestanding claims of actual innocence,” and the limitations of these 
measures, including Illinois, New Mexico, and Maryland). 
 284 In some states the Attorney General’s office may conduct most postconviction review 
or initiate wrongful conviction case review processes. See COLO. DEP’T OF LAW, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL ANNOUNCES COLORADO’S RECEIPT OF $1.2 MILLION IN FEDERAL FUNDS TO START A 
DNA-BASED EXONERATION PROGRAM, https://www.denverda.org/wp-content/uploads/news-
release/2009/Justice-Review-Project.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7UU-3PAV]. 
 285 In response to budgetary constraints, some jurisdictions may apply for federal grant 
funds to support a CIU. See BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, UPHOLDING THE RULE OF LAW AND 
PREVENTING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS PROGRAM FY 2019 COMPETITIVE GRANT 
ANNOUNCEMENT, https://www.bja.gov/funding/URLPWC19.pdf [https://perma.cc/XNX7-
FCML]. 
 286 See generally MAP OF INNOCENCE NETWORK MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 277 
and accompanying text. 
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approaches.  Therefore, it is to be expected that postconviction innocence 
review practices will vary across states and even within states.  When chief 
prosecutors clearly communicate these practices internally, they can provide 
line prosecutors conducting postconviction case review with a greater sense 
of discretion and facilitate collaboration with defense attorneys.  By clearly 
communicating policies externally, they assist defense attorneys and pro se 
defendants in strategizing about how to proceed with their claims.  This will 
conserve prosecutors’ resources and assist state lawmakers in identifying 
potential gaps in postconviction innocence review that could be filled 
through a state innocence commission, statewide appellate office, or other 
mechanism.  CIUs will experience growing pains through trial and error as 
they implement systematic innocence review practices.287  Transparency, 
even throughout these periods of trial and error, may ultimately result in more 
sustainable solutions. 
B. REFORMS FOR THE POSTCONVICTION APPEALS PROCESS 
Without commensurate reforms to the postconviction appeals process, 
the individual efforts of prosecutors to correct false convictions are unlikely 
to improve outcomes for postconviction claimants who cannot find 
representation among innocence organizations or afford private counsel, and 
they will almost certainly fail to shorten time to exoneration.  In some states, 
structural reforms to the appellate process are long overdue.288  The findings 
reported here suggest that prosecutors rarely review innocence claims until 
the defendant has already exhausted every other option.289  This inefficiency 
taxes the appellate system as much as it harms the falsely convicted.  In order 
to “narrow the error correction gap,” Nancy King recommends allowing 
defendants to file a postconviction motion before completing the direct 
appeal.290  Some states already do this;291 others have created a loophole for 
 
 287 See supra Section III.A. 
 288 See generally Findley, supra note 40, at 592 (exploring reforms to the appellate process 
that will address failings “to protect against wrongful convictions”); Hartung, supra note 57, 
at 252 (arguing for the need for retrospective policy change directed towards postconviction 
procedure); Leventhal, supra note 31, at 1486 (arguing that “a freestanding claim of actual 
innocence on constitutional grounds would overcome the procedural hurdles to postconviction 
relief”); Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679 (2007) (proposing that appellate 
attorneys be able to file claims of ineffectiveness on direct appeal in certain circumstances). 
 289 See supra Section III.B. 
 290 King, supra note 34, at 267 (suggesting “steps to narrow the error correction gap”). 
 291 See Findley, supra note 40, at 611 (comparing Wisconsin’s postconviction system with 
those in other states. Petitioners often tried to raise postconviction issues on direct appeal, 
taxing the system. “The advantage of Wisconsin’s process from an innocence protection 
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defendants to file ineffective assistance of counsel claims sooner.292  Such 
remedies are necessary to ensure that defendants can raise postconviction 
innocence claims in a timely manner and before they are deprived of the 
assistance of defense counsel. 
State legislatures may also establish or strengthen new evidence statutes 
for defendants to file “freestanding” actual innocence claims based on new 
evidence.  In the past two decades, postconviction DNA statutes have been 
adopted in every state,293 and some of these statutes include a provision for 
appointing defense counsel.294  The options for falsely convicted defendants 
who lack DNA evidence are much more limited.295  Legislative and court 
remedies recognizing non-DNA-based new evidence of innocence provide 
prosecutors with the legal mechanism to dismiss false convictions as well as 
the institutional support to do so. 
Defendants may introduce new evidence in a new trial motion, but most 
states impose a statute of limitations ranging from a month to three years, 
and as short as ten days from the entry of judgment.296  In many states, after 
the filing deadline for the new trial motion has passed, defendants cannot 
present facts outside the court record until the postconviction stage, when 
they will not be provided with counsel.  In contrast, New York and New 
Jersey allow inmates to challenge their conviction based on newly discovered 
evidence at any time.297  Other states might follow suit and eliminate this 
arbitrary statute of limitations.  New evidence, such as the confession of an 
 
perspective is that it provides a mechanism for introducing new evidence of innocence, and 
new facts underlying claims of innocence-related error, into the direct appeal process.”). 
 292 See Primus, supra note 288, at 710 (summarizing and suggesting improvements upon 
existing state structures for ineffective assistance of counsel claims). 
 293 See ACCESS TO POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/access-post-conviction-dna-testing/ [https://perma.
cc/2GAJ-9X6E] (“Today every state has enacted a post-conviction DNA statute because the 
traditional appeals process was often insufficient for proving a wrongful conviction.”). 
 294 See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 64.01 (West 2017) https://www.innocen
ceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/TX-CRIM-PRO-Art.-64.01-et-seq.-TX-pc-dna-a
md.-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/676S-G7FU] (“A convicted person is entitled to counsel 
during a proceeding under this chapter. The convicting court shall appoint counsel for the 
convicted person if the person informs the court that the person wishes to submit a motion 
under this chapter, the court finds reasonable grounds for a motion to be filed, and the court 
determines that the person is indigent.”). 
 295 See Medwed, supra note 38, at 658 (“Without a doubt, non-DNA cases are difficult 
for defendants to overturn through state court proceedings given the subjectivity involved in 
assessing most forms of new evidence and the absence of a method to prove innocence to a 
scientific certainty.”). 
 296 See Brooks et al., supra note 31, at 1071. 
 297 See id. at 1074. 
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alternate suspect, evidence concealed by police or prosecutors, or even a new 
forensic discovery, may emerge at any time. 
CONCLUSION 
The postconviction stage, though often overlooked, serves a critical 
function in criminal justice system processing as the final safeguard before 
false convictions escape correction. 
Prosecutors’ discretion empowers them to discover and dismiss false 
convictions amidst a dearth of available options.  Prosecutors’ offices that 
have successfully facilitated an exoneration can serve as a model for other 
jurisdictions of various sizes, caseloads, and resources.  However, appellate 
rules and workplace hierarchies can influence and constrain prosecutors’ 
postconviction efficacy.  Both CIU and non-CIU offices faced challenges in 
implementing objective postconviction review procedures.  Therefore, 
prosecutors’ efforts should still be supported through legal and legislative 
reforms.  In the absence of these reforms, prosecutors can facilitate 
exonerations, but they are less likely to discover false convictions.  Future 
legal research may consider, holistically, the complementary functions of 
prosecutorial review and judicial review to provide a late stage safeguard 
against false convictions.  By analyzing the interconnection between 
prosecutors, courts, and legislative decisions, researchers may identify how 
best to direct reform solutions. 
